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 Post subject: NY Times reports Libyan-based network was building NUKE
PostPosted: Wed Jun 30, 2004 5:03 pm 
Mod

Joined: Tue Feb 03, 2004 11:07 pm
Posts: 534
FOXNEWS

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,121002,00.html

Moderator's Note: I've been doing some research on Loftus to see if he's talking thru his hat. Haven't found a cite one way or the other on him. Does seem well recognized in the Jewish community. He is President of the Florida Holocaust Museum, the fifth largest in the world.

See his web site at:

http://www.john-loftus.com

Bio at:

http://www.john-loftus.com/bio.asp

Anyone out there who can provide more info on Mr. Loftus and what he believes and whether there is any factual basis for his opinions?

*****
Hidden Benefits?

Wednesday, May 26, 2004

By David Asman



Even some of those who say Iraq is better off with Saddam out of power, now argue that the Iraq war simply wasn't worth the cost. But getting rid of Saddam was not just an act of charity toward the Iraqi people, as new evidence emerges of a nuclear weapons program in Libya.

With the fall of Saddam, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi suddenly began dismantling his $100 million nuclear weapons program under our watchful eye. He has provided a wealth of information, which, when combined with evidence found in Iraq and information provided by the busted Pakistani nuclear black market salesman, A.Q. Kahn, reveal a sophisticated nuclear weapons development program. It pulled together Libyan money, North Korean uranium and, according to former federal prosecutor John Loftus, about 300 Iraqi nuclear scientists and engineers based in Libya.

The New York Times reports that the Libyan-based network was close to finding the means to enrich enough uranium to make a nuclear bomb. The Iraqi war stopped the nuclear bomb project in its tracks. The abandonment of that project provides yet another element that should be factored into the costs and benefits of getting rid of Saddam.

And that's the Observer.

© Associated Press. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2004 ComStock, Inc.
This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

Copyright 2004 FOX News Network, LLC. All rights reserved.
All market data delayed 20 minutes.

_________________
Ron Wright,
Board of Advisors, Security Council Member,
http://WWW.HSPIG.ORG


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 Profile  
 
 Post subject: ElBaradei: Pakistani gave nuclear know-how to 20 nations
PostPosted: Thu Jul 08, 2004 3:40 pm 
Haaretz.com

http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/449009.html

*****

w w w . h a a r e t z . c o m
Last update - 18:22 08/07/2004
ElBaradei: Pakistani gave nuclear know-how to 20 nations, firms
By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz Correspondent

Israel must take the spread of nuclear technology into account and remember that terror is getting more sophisticated: Other countries could get nuclear weapons, and the ordinary deterrence that worked in the past may not be effective any more. Israel must therefore think about a different regional security concept and lend a hand to it.

The above was the key message in an interview granted to Haaretz by Mohammed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, during his brief visit to Israel.

He is a practiced diplomat and a top-flight professional, but he does not always get what he wants as the IAEA's top executive - as has been evident in Iran and North Korea. Nevertheless, ElBaradei is very attentive to what is happening.

Summarizing what he no doubt heard in his closed meetings in Israel, he said that there is a very strong sense of existential threat in Israel. ElBaradei, who visited Israel several times in the context of previous positions he held at the IAEA, noted that this strong sense of insecurity has remained unchanged in recent years.

ElBaradei said there are worrying signs that the nonproliferation regime is coming undone, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Israel has to take into account that other countries or, heaven forbid, terrorist organizations could get nuclear weapons, he said. Under those circumstances, nuclear accidents could happen, or wrong assessments could be made in this sphere.

As an example of the spread of nuclear know-how, he used Pakistan. He said that Abdul Kadr Khan, considered the father of the Pakistani bomb, had commercial contacts with at least 20 different countries and large companies. The IAEA only learned about some of it 18 months ago, when Khan's contacts with Libya came to light, but the Americans and others had been tracking the Pakistani's contacts for some time before that. Clearly, this was not the work of Abdul Kadr Khan on his own.


The IAEA's inspection work in Libya is still not over, said ElBaradei. In September, Libya is due to hand over more documentation to IAEA inspectors and to respond to questions and provide various clarifications.

Asked if Muammar Gadhafi's decision to change his policies was the result of the war in Iraq, ElBaradei said that the negotiations with Libya began before the Iraq war and that apparently, it was the economic situation in Iraq caused by sanctions that was most influential.

As for why Egypt, Libya's next-door neighbor, knew nothing of the impending change in Libyan policy, ElBaradei did not hesitate to say that this was apparently an Egyptian intelligence failure.

ElBaradei said that he does not know of any country beside Iran and Libya - such as Syria - with whom the Pakistani nuclear scientist had commercial contacts.

ElBaradei refused to accept the analysis that Iran is inevitably going to get the bomb, so efforts to prevent it are a lost cause. It is true, he said, that Iran is making an effort to acquire nuclear know-how, including the full cycle of nuclear fuel production, but he does not know what Iran's intentions concerning nuclear weapons are.

He did confirm that signs were discovered in Iran of uranium that was 54 percent enriched (the manufacture of uranium-based nuclear weapons requires 90 percent enrichment). But he also said that the Iranians have frozen their uranium enrichment program. He said there is a very complex situation in Iran: It is in dialogue with European countries, but other country also need to join. This month there will be another meeting between the Iranians and Europeans, he said, and ways have to be found to create a package deal with Iran that would grant it various guarantees, and thus persuade it.

Asked why he does not take the Iran issue to the UN Security Council, he said that no smoking gun has been found - and anyway, what could the security council do? Everyone remembers the case of North Korea and its nuclear problems at the Security Council. Moreover, he said, the world should take care not to reach a situation in which extremists in Iran call for the country to abandon the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Asked why the IAEA does not reveal the names of those countries that helped Iran in their nuclear acquisition efforts, such as China or Pakistan, ElBaradei said simply that the IAEA will need those countries' cooperation in the future.

As for his hosts, ElBaradei said that it is clear to him that a new dialogue must begin in the Middle East, and he is ready to help. He said he feels that people are listening. A different regional security concept must be developed that would prevent a nuclear arms race, he said. He hoped that a small step has been taken in this direction, and that maybe in the future, a light will appear at the end of this difficult tunnel.

Yossi Melman adds:

Despite government efforts to keep the ElBaradei visit low-key and out of the press, the visitor has held three impromptu press conferences - one at his hotel, one after his Jerusalem meeting with Health Minister Danny Naveh and one after his Ramat Aviv meeting with Gideon Frank, head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission.

ElBaradei met with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Thursday. No information regarding the contents of the meeting was released.

The IAEA chief is also slated to deliver a speech at Hebrew University before leaving the country. He is also slated to meet with Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom at the airport, as Shalom returns from the United States and ElBaradei leaves for Vienna, the IAEA headquarters.


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 Post subject: BUSH TOLD THE TRUTH! - Niger Uranium Yellow Cake
PostPosted: Sat Jul 10, 2004 9:35 pm 
Instapundit (Quoting the British Financal Times)

http://instapundit.com/archives/016446.php

*****

July 07, 2004

BUSH LIED TOLD THE TRUTH!

A UK government inquiry into the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from Niger.

The inquiry by Lord Butler, which was delivered to the printers on Wednesday and is expected to be released on July 14, has examined the intelligence that underpinned the UK government's claims about the threat from Iraq. . . .

The Financial Times revealed last week that a key part of the UK's intelligence on the uranium came from a European intelligence service that undertook a three-year surveillance of an alleged clandestine uranium-smuggling operation of which Iraq was a part.

Intelligence officials have now confirmed that the results of this operation formed an important part of the conclusions of British intelligence. The same information was passed to the US but US officials did not incorporate it in their assessment.


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 Post subject: LIBYA - [NUKE]Work was 'much further advanced' than expected
PostPosted: Tue Jul 13, 2004 1:48 am 
CNN

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/12 ... a.nuclear/

Moderator's Note: Now remember where you heard this first!

*****

Bush official: Libya's nuclear program a surprise
Work was 'much further advanced' than expected, official says

WASHINGTON (CNN) --Libya's nuclear weapons program was "much further advanced" than U.S. and British intelligence agencies had thought, and included centrifuges and a uranium-enrichment program, all necessary components in making a nuclear bomb, a senior Bush administration official said Friday.

"Libya admitted to nuclear fuel-cycle projects that were intended to support a nuclear weapons program, weapons development, including uranium enrichment," this official said.

The acknowledgment of a nuclear program marked the first time Libya has ever done so. The U.S. and British governments said Friday that Libya has agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and to allow international weapons inspectors into the country.

The Bush official said Libya also showed a team of United Nations and British inspectors "a significant amount of mustard" gas -- a lethal nerve agent that can cause internal and external bleeding. The gas was produced more than a decade ago, the official said.

In addition, those inspectors visited medical and agricultural facilities that could be used in the development of biological weapons, this official said.

But it was Libya's nuclear program that most alarmed officials.

"We were not surprised on the chemical side," the official said. "On the nuclear side ... my understanding is that they did have a much further advanced program, including centrifuges."

This official said the inspectors saw completed centrifuges, as well as "thousands of centrifuge parts."

Another senior administration official said Libya's weapons programs are robust "in every area."

"It's enormous," the official said. "We have grave concerns about the program."

The first official said Libya approached British and U.S. officials in mid-March, about the same time the war in Iraq began. But that official stressed there was nothing to indicate the nuclear or chemical weapons materials came from Iraq.

At the same time, the official refused to say whether the government of Libya's leader, Col. Moammar Gadhafi, had supplied material to Saddam Hussein's former regime, and the official refused to name other nations that Libya has worked with on weapons development.

However, the official said Libya admitted cooperating with North Korea on the development of "extended-range Scud missiles."

The team of U.N. and British inspectors visited Libya in October and then again in early December, searching more than 10 sites connected to the nuclear program, the official said. The inspectors included experts in nuclear, chemical, biological and missile development. CIA officials also visited key sites.

"The Libyans were quite open," the official said. "They provided access to facilities. They provided substantial documentation about their programs. And we were able to take samples and to take photographs and other evidence."

The official added: "While Libya was forthcoming in many areas and provided considerable detail on past activities, there are a number of issues we continue to explore."

Britain and the United States will now work with Libya, and the international bodies charged with stopping the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons. Those two agencies are the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.



Find this article at:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/12 ... ya.nuclear


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 Post subject: Hey, Want to Buy an Atomic Bomb?
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 2:16 pm 
StrategyWorld.com

http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2004214.asp

*****

Hey, Want to Buy an Atomic Bomb?
by James Dunnigan
February 14, 2004


The details of how Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist and "father of the Islamic atomic bomb" ran a "nuclear bomb plans for sale" operation, have come out. In a situation so typical of Pakistan, corruption and willingness to use a government position for personal gain led Kahn to go into business for himself, selling nuclear weapons technology to anyone who could pay (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and possibly others).

The CIA picked up hints of this business in the 1990s, some ten years ago. Bit by bit, the evidence piled up. Finally, Pakistan's president was forced to confront Kahn, and Kahn was forced, by the weight of the evidence, to admit his guilt. But Kahn is so popular in Pakistan (as "the father of the Moslem bomb") that is was considered political suicide to try and prosecute him for his crimes. So Khan agreed to admit his guilt (phrased as "errors in judgment"), in return for a pardon.

Actually, Khan's crimes were quite extensive. He had begun by stealing plans for uranium processing equipment (centrifuges and such) while working for a European nuclear power engineering company three decades ago. He was later convicted for this crime, but he was by then safely back in Pakistan and working his way towards the leadership of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Khan was energetic and opportunistic. Although his technical contributions to the bomb design effort were mainly contained in the technology he had stolen, he managed to take credit for much of the efforts other Pakistani scientists and engineers contributed. A lot of other nuclear weapons technology was apparently purchased from China in the 1980s. This was discovered when Chinese documents were found among the material Libya turned over recently. The Libyans had paid Kahn as much as $50 million for the bomb plans and some of the equipment needed. The Chinese became cozy with Pakistan when the U.S. began to put the pressure on Pakistan to halt it's nuclear weapons development. The Chinese wanted to beef up Pakistan, in case both nations had trouble with India. China and India have several outstanding border disputes, and in the 1980s, China was still wary of Russia (who was a major arms supplier for India.)

Khan also abused his position as head of the nuclear weapons program by giving sweetheart contracts to friends and family, skimming money for himself and taking bribes. But this is so common in Pakistan, that no one really noticed. Even the sale of nuclear weapons technology (but not a complete bomb) to foreign nations was not considered all that unusual. There were dozens of others, both in the nuclear weapons program, and outside it, who worked with Kahn to move the goods, and collect and hide (and share in) the money. Khan's pardon allows him to keep the money. But the CIA, and European intelligence agencies, believe that Khan's group are still in business. So the investigation continues, and Pakistan has been told that members of Khan's group (including Khan) are fair game if caught outside Pakistan.

American nuclear security experts are working with Pakistan to equip Pakistani nukes with electronic locks that prevent the weapons from being used by anyone who does not have the proper codes. This means that if any Pakistanis try and sell an actual a-bomb, they will have to get the codes as well. This won't make it impossible for a Pakistani bomb to be sold, just more difficult. And Khan has shown that you can sell nuclear secrets and get away with it. It's a bad precedent.

North Korea has denied being a Khan customer, but Iran and Libya were caught red handed with material from Pakistan (Libya admits it, Iran is stonewalling). Evidence collected in Iraq indicates that Saddam was approached by Khan's salesmen, but had not yet put down the five million dollars required to get the weapons information coming


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 Post subject: Black Market Nuke Trade
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 2:22 pm 
ABCNEWS

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/WNT/Inve ... 40304.html

*****

Black Market Nuke Trade
U.S. Knew of Pakistan Nuclear Dealings for at Least Seven Years
By Brian Ross
ABCNEWS.com

March 4— The United States had knowledge of a network of black market nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to countries accused of supporting terrorists for at least seven years before it was publicly exposed, ABCNEWS has learned.


What U.S., British and U.N. investigators found was that a company in Pakistan was prepared to sell everything needed to make a nuclear bomb — plans, equipment and fuel — for $50 million, with no questions asked about how it might be used.
The one-stop nuclear package was even advertised at a Pakistani arms show in 2000, where the company handed out brochures to visitors, including a reporter for Jane's Defense Weekly.

"[The company] gave out two very glossy brochures, inside of which they promised to provide all of the components needed for a uranium-enrichment facility," reporter Andrew Koch said.

Behind it all: the now-infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, who confessed last month to selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Investigators say he made millions running the operation.

"I think that now we have to confront the reality that there's a nuclear black market, a Wal-Mart, in effect, of nuclear smuggling and it covers four continents, a dozen countries, lots of inventive behavior," said Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs.

Officials say it was a far-flung operation. A factory in Malaysia was set up to make the high-speed gas centrifuge parts that are used to produce weapons-grade uranium. The son of Malaysia's prime minister was one of the factory's owners.

"I did not talk with him on this subject. It is entirely my son's business," said Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmed Badawi.

Network Extended to Europe

The black market's trail stretched all the way to Europe. U.S. officials say a key to the black market was a small, family-run company in the Swiss canton of St. Gallen.

It was there, officials say, that Swiss engineers helped to design 14 key parts of the centrifuge sent to Libya to produce the bomb's fuel, enriched uranium. Investigators say Urs Tinner, one of the engineers, took the designs to the Malaysian factory and supervised manufacturing.

Tinner, who admits his father has been connected to Kahn for more than a decade, said he had no idea the work he did was connected to the nuclear black market.

"We make parts like, let's say, every other company in Switzerland," he told ABCNEWS. "Mechanical shops. It is always the same."

But U.S. officials say Tinner's operation was a lot more than just another Swiss machine shop.

"He was the key sparkplug to make sure that these 14 types of centrifuge components were made and then delivered. And then [he would] clean up the operation, take out all the centrifuge drawings," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C.

U.S. Knew for at Least Seven Years

It turns out that the United States has known about Khan's nuclear dealings for at least seven years.

Documents obtained by ABCNEWS show the U.S. had enough evidence in 1997 to put his company, Khan Research Laboratory, on a kind of U.S. blacklist for suspected illegal activity. The U.S. Commerce Department barred American companies from selling Khan's company any materials that might have nuclear or military applications.

The special restrictions raises the question now of how, since that time, Kahn was able to make nuclear deals with Libya and Iran without U.S. detection.

And Kahn's scientists, according to investigators, were also able to meet with Osama bin Laden without being detected by the United States.

Whatever the United States knew about Kahn, it clearly did not aggressively pursue him through both the Clinton and the Bush administrations. Secretary of State Colin Powell said today: "I think we're learning a great deal more about the network, and we're tracing the network to all of [Khan's] various customers and all of the different parts of the network infrastructure. I think we have pretty much taken apart the network in the sense that it isn't going to be doing that much in the future, and we're going to work to pull up everything we know about it from the past."

But Albright considers it to be a big intelligence failure.

"I mean, if the intelligence community is charged with finding out this kind of information, then the United States intelligence failed," he said.


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 Post subject:
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 3:16 pm 
This item is available on the Benador Associates website, at http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/2009

A.Q. KAHN AND THE END OF MAD
by George Jonas
National Post
February 16, 2004

Later generations may think of our phase of the nuclear age as extending from Kahn to Kahn -- that is, from Herman Kahn, the scientist and game theorist whose 1962 treatise Thinking About the Unthinkable did much to shape our notions concerning nuclear deterrence, to Dr. A.Q. Kahn, a leading figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Herman Kahn, caricatured in the famous movie Dr. Strangelove, ssentially held that if you cannot maximize your gains through disarmament, you might minimize possible losses with a buildup of weapons. He made a case for MAD -- mutual assured destruction -- as a way of maintaining peace.

His namesake, Dr. A.Q. Kahn, played a key role in developing akistan's "Islamic bomb" -- then sold certain nuclear technologies, ainly in relation to uranium enrichment, to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Dr. Kahn didn't transfer nuclear technologies to these terrorist-supporting states because he believed that a little ADness, Third World-style, would promote peace. He did it for oney.

In 1995, France was greeted with near-universal condemnation or testing its nuclear weapons. John Major, then prime minister of ritain, was virtually alone in sounding a different note. The leader of Western Europe's only other nuclear power remarked that rance's deterrent was an assurance of global peace. Was Britain's former prime minister right, and were the people who condemned France then, and India and Pakistan since, wrong? The late political philosopher Hannah Arendt, perhaps best known for her theory of "the banality of evil," raised the question in the following terms in her 1963 book On Revolution:

"Could it not be," she rote in her treatise many regard as a lassic, "that our present perplexity [about how to resolve issues between nations] indicates our lack of preparedness for a disappearance of war?"

By "war" Ms. Arendt didn't mean every kind of armed conflict or olitical violence, only all-out war between great powers. This option, it seemed to her, may have been permanently closed by certain historic developments.

The most important of these was the development of nuclear weapons. Ms. Arendt listed some others, such as the re- ntroduction of total war -- the type of war that, like terrorism, takes no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. total war did exist in antiquity and prehistory, but then largely disappeared until the First World War.

Another factor she noted was that in our times no government -- indeed, no form of government -- seemed to be able to survive military defeat. This, too, was relatively new. In times past, defeat in war may have lost a king some territory and influence, but rarely the monarchy itself.

Assume that Ms. Arendt's insight was correct and war between reat powers -- or, more precisely, between nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan -- had disappeared as a viable policy option, without any other changes having occurred in human nature or in international relations. If so, we'd be in a truly perplexing situation. Great powers could no longer let war solve conflicts of foreign policy that they hadn't been able to solve by other means. Mankind would have lost the option of war, its ancient and natural last esort.

"Ancient" or "natural" aren't synonyms for "desirable" of course. here's no implication here that war has ever been a desirable ption, only that it has been an existing option. If it no longer existed, what would replace it?

A fundamental change in human nature, attractive as it might be, was hard to envisage. Besides, even if accomplished, we'd have no idea what the resulting "post-human" nature would be like, or any ssurance that it would be better.

In any case, there were no signs of a radical transformation in nternational relations. The UN certainly hadn't turned out to be as fine an ins itution as originally envisaged. But even if it had, in cases of tractable conflict it could offer no substitute for war. At best, it might resolve to go to war itself on behalf of one side or another. When Ms. Arendt postulated that no one has come up with a method that could reliably solve those problems for which war used to be a painful, cruel, but fairly reliable solution, she seemed to have been right.

There was one hopeful possibility in this perplexing era. It wasn't that war may be circumvented by goodwill, mutual understanding or any such utopian dreams, but by a natural consequence of technology. Simply put, wars that were incapable of being won ay have turned out to be incapable of being fought.

The idea of deterrence itself was based on this assumption. If it ever proved to be an erroneous assumption, it would no doubt extract a horrible penalty from mankind, but deterrence has had a good track record until now. We avoided "war" -- in the sense that Ms. Arendt used the word -- for nearly 60 years.

War clearly hasn't been avoided because human beings have become saner or more reasonable than before, or because there are fewer clashing interests between great powers, or because better methods of solving them have been invented. War has been avoided solely because its potential cost has come to exceed its potential benefit.

At least this seemed to be the equation until Dr. Kahn came along. The hero of the Islamic bomb changed it -- changed it fundamentally, for a fistful of dollars. Now all bets are off. Computer
models of great powers Herman Kahn used for his calculations no longer apply. The terrorists, along with the rogue states that support them, have different dynamics. Ms. Arendt appears to have been right in her second postulation, too:

Mankind wasn't prepared for the disappearance of war. It seems terrorism has become the substitute for war, and this substitute may now be turning nuclear. After Dr. Khan confessed last month, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf accepted his apology. History isn't likely to be so lenient.

© National Post 2004
This item is available on the Benador Associates website, at http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/2009


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 Post subject: Pakistan leaks prompt Western resolve
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 3:25 pm 
BBC News

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3461855.stm

*****

Pakistan leaks prompt Western resolve

By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

The admission by the father of the Pakistan nuclear bomb, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he gave nuclear secrets to other countries has stunned world nuclear experts.
It will also strengthen the determination of the United States to try to stop nuclear proliferation.

The countries Dr Kahn is said to have helped are North Korea, Libya and Iran.

Dr Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, an expert on North Korea in particular, said: "This is by far the worst example of nuclear proliferation in world history.

"It is clear that AQ Kahn and his confederates from the laboratory which he ran have been doing this for 15 years.

"They did it partly for money, but AQ Khan also believed that the spread of nuclear weapons, especially to some Islamic countries, was a good thing and lessened the threat of hegemony by the United States."

'Determined operation'

The story goes back to the mid-1970s and shows how one determined operation can avoid the international measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Dr Khan is believed to have got the design of a centrifuge for enriching uranium to weapons grade from an Anglo-Dutch-German company called Urenco, where he was working.

He used this as the basis for building Pakistan's own bomb.

The Urenco blueprint or developments of it are what he is said to have given to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

But he also handed over, at least to Libya, designs for a nuclear warhead.


Libya is said by the New York Times to have paid $50m for a design which resembled a Chinese warhead once given to Pakistan.

It was the admission by Iran last year that it had obtained centrifuge designs on the black market that started the investigation along the trail which led back to Pakistan.

Iran has since signed an Additional Protocol with the UN's nuclear agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under which inspections will be much more intense.

Libya has also agreed to open up its own nuclear programme to inspection by American and British experts and the IAEA.

Government contacts?

Dr Khan used front companies around the world to make purchases, sent them to the Gulf state of Dubai and from there they were delivered to their eventual destinations.

The question now is whether the Pakistan Government or senior people within it knew what was going on.

"We may never know, " said Dr Samore," but many will think it unlikely that they could have done so much for so long on their own."

The suspicion is that North Korea might have provided Pakistan with missile technology in return for nuclear expertise.

That would have required government to government contacts.

If this had happened in a country other than Pakistan, the drums would be beating loudly in Washington.

Pakistan might have qualified for membership of the axis of evil.


If this had happened in a country other than Pakistan, the drums would be beating loudly in Washington


But because Pakistan's President General Musharraf is such a close ally of the United States in the war on terror, a scenario seems to have been agreed under which Dr Khan would make his public admission but would absolve the Pakistani Government.

It is a procedure which the Americans may, for diplomatic reasons, accept.

Certainly it will make Washington, supported by its allies, even more determined to investigate and try to stop the spread of nuclear technology and weapons.

'Black market'

But the revelation has shown how the black market can operate under the nose of the IAEA.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, said on Thursday that the Pakistan connection was the "tip of an iceberg".

He had previously warned a World Economic Forum in Davos of "a very sophisticated and complex underground network of black market operators ... not that much different from organised crime cartels".

IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming said that the IAEA was aware of a network that involved "players in five countries".

Dubai and Malaysia are believed to be among these five, according to informed sources.

"This needs to be thoroughly investigated and stopped in its tracks," she said.

"An urgent priority for the IAEA is to find out if others have bought into the nuclear network."

The IAEA board meets on 8 March to review its monitoring programmes in Iran and Libya.

North Korea has withdrawn from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/w ... 461855.stm

Published: 2004/02/05 14:21:53 GMT

© BBC MMIV


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 Post subject: Nuclear Program in Iran Tied To Pakistan
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 3:45 pm 
Washingtonpost.com

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/ wp-dyn/A18170-2003Dec20?language=printer

*****

washingtonpost.com
Nuclear Program in Iran Tied To Pakistan
Complex Network Acquired Technology and Blueprints

By Joby Warrick
XXXXXXX XXXX Staff Writer
Sunday, December 21, 2003; Page A01


VIENNA -- Evidence discovered in a probe of Iran's secret nuclear program points overwhelmingly to Pakistan as the source of crucial technology that put Iran on a fast track toward becoming a nuclear weapons power, according to U.S. and European officials familiar with the investigation.

The serious nature of the discoveries prompted a decision by Pakistan two weeks ago to detain three of its top nuclear scientists for several days of questioning, with U.S. intelligence experts allowed to assist, the officials said. The scientists have not been charged with any crime, and Pakistan continues to insist that it never wittingly provided nuclear assistance to Iran or anyone else.

Documents provided by Iran to U.N. nuclear inspectors since early November have exposed the outlines of a vast, secret procurement network that successfully acquired thousands of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries over a 17-year period. While Iran has not directly identified Pakistan as a supplier, Pakistani individuals and companies are strongly implicated as sources of key blueprints, technical guidance and equipment for a pilot uranium-enrichment plant that was first exposed by Iranian dissidents 18 months ago, government officials and independent weapons experts said.

While American presidents since Ronald Reagan worried that Iran might seek nuclear weapons, U.S. and allied intelligence agencies were unable to halt Iran's most significant nuclear acquisitions, or even to spot a major nuclear facility under construction until it was essentially completed.

Although the alleged transfers occurred years ago, suggestions of Pakistani aid to Iran's nuclear program have further complicated the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, a key ally in the war against terrorism.

In documents and interviews with investigators of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iranian officials have offered detailed accounts of how they obtained sensitive equipment from European, Asian and North American companies. Much of the equipment was routed through a transshipment hub in the Persian Gulf port city of Dubai to conceal the actual destination, according to officials familiar with Iran's disclosures.

The disclosures offer a striking illustration of the difficulties faced by U.S. officials in trying to detect and interdict shipments of contraband useful in making weapons of mass destruction. Iran appears to have obtained the equipment by exploiting a gray zone of porous borders, middlemen, front companies and weak law enforcement where the components of such weapons are bought and sold.

Iran's pilot facility, which is now functional, and a much larger uranium-enrichment plant under construction next door are designed to produce enough fissile material to make at least two dozen nuclear bombs each year.

China and Russia also made significant contributions to the Iranian program in the past, IAEA documents show. Both countries were the focus of a long-running U.S. campaign to cut off nuclear assistance to Iran.

In a new finding, sophisticated laboratory tests by the IAEA detected traces of Soviet-made highly enriched uranium at Iran's Kalaye nuclear facility, a former testing center for uranium-enrichment equipment, knowledgeable officials said. Several distinct types of enriched uranium have been found at the site, the officials added. Although there are other possible explanations, the finding could indicate that Iran obtained some fissile material from a former Soviet state to use in testing its equipment, the officials said.

By far the most valuable assistance to Iran came from still-unnamed individuals who provided top-secret designs and key components for uranium-processing machines known as gas centrifuges, the officials said.

Centrifuges are technologically complex machines that spin at supersonic speeds to extract the small amounts of fissile material present in natural uranium. Uranium that has been enriched at lower levels is typically used as fuel in nuclear power plants, while a more concentrated product known as highly enriched uranium is used in nuclear submarines, research reactors and nuclear weapons.

The blueprints, which the IAEA has reviewed, depict a type of centrifuge that is nearly identical to a machine used by Pakistan in the early years of its nuclear program, according to U.S. officials and weapons experts familiar with the designs. The plans and components, which were acquired over several installments from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, allowed Iran to leapfrog over several major technological hurdles to make its own enriched uranium, a necessary ingredient in commercial nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons.

"Acquiring the drawings and a few components was a tremendous boost to Iran's centrifuge efforts," said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector in Iraq and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington research group that tracked Iran's nuclear procurements for more than a decade. "The possession of detailed designs could allow Iran to skip many difficult research steps."

Surprising Disclosures


It is unclear exactly why the United States and its allies failed to detect and halt Iran's most significant nuclear acquisitions.

One possible reason, according to some former government officials and outside experts, is that U.S. agencies were looking in the wrong place. American administrations since the late 1980s viewed the Soviet Union and then Russia as the most likely source of nuclear aid to Iran, launching intensive efforts to persuade Moscow to sever or scale back technological links to the Islamic republic.

"For too long we were running our Iran policy through Moscow," said Jon Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "We saw Russia as Iran's main source of technology, and if shut off, the flow to Iran's program would freeze in its tracks. That was shortsighted."

Former top U.S. proliferation officials contend that the attention paid to Russia was hardly misplaced. The United States foiled several efforts by Iran to obtain sensitive technology from Russia in the 1990s. But some officials acknowledged that they were stunned to learn of the progress Iran had made with the help of partners closer to home.

"While the U.S. was heavily focused on Russian assistance, the Iranians were getting help elsewhere on the centrifuge program and making major headway -- and the U.S. was essentially in the dark on that," said Robert Einhorn, the State Department's former assistant secretary for nonproliferation. "It took information from an Iranian dissident group to expose how far Iran had gotten."

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons, insisting that it is only exercising its right to develop a civilian nuclear power industry, including its own indigenous supply of nuclear fuel. Russia is helping Iran build a nuclear power plant in the port city of Bushehr that both countries insist is a civilian nuclear project.

Last month, in the face of mounting international pressure, Iran's leaders agreed to open the country's nuclear facilities to surprise inspections and to turn over hundreds of pages of documents to the IAEA. The agency has not commented publicly on the contents of the documents, but several U.S. officials and diplomatic sources familiar with Iran's disclosures agreed to discuss them on the condition they not be identified by name. Some of the revelations about Iran's nuclear procurement program also are described in a draft of a new report by Albright's research group. A copy of the draft study was made available to The XXXXXXX XXXX.

The disclosures do not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether Iran was actively seeking to build nuclear weapons. But they do show that Iran was intent on keeping its nuclear acquisitions secret, and that it sought a range of technologies far beyond those typically found in countries with commercial nuclear power programs.

An IAEA report made public in November revealed that Iran had secretly manufactured small amounts of uranium and plutonium, a violation of Iran's agreements under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That report also documented Iran's efforts to enrich uranium using a variety of methods, including gas centrifuges and lasers. Iran's biggest success, the construction of a pilot gas centrifuge plant for enriching uranium, was a well-guarded secret until it was exposed last August by the National Council for Resistance in Iran, an umbrella group representing opponents of Iran's Islamic government.

When IAEA inspectors discovered 160 working centrifuges during their first visit to the Natanz plant in February, Iran initially claimed to have designed and built them alone. But Iran's story began to unravel when the inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium at Natanz and at a second, now-defunct pilot plant in Kalaye.

Iran, which insists it has never made highly enriched uranium, admitted receiving substantial foreign help, including numerous secondhand centrifuge components that were imported from an unnamed country.

Officially, Iran's leaders maintain that they bought the components on the black market, and they still don't know where the parts came from. But to the inspectors and independent experts on centrifuge design, the machines offer abundant clues.

The draft report by Albright's group, based on experts familiar with the Iranian machine, describes it as a modified version of a centrifuge built decades ago by Urenco, a consortium of the British, Dutch and German governments. The machine is about six feet high and is made of aluminum and a special type of high-strength steel. The design is one of several known to have been stolen in the 1970s by a Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who later became known as the father of the Pakistani bomb.

Pakistan modified the Urenco design and manufactured a number of the machines before abandoning the centrifuge for a sturdier model, said Albright, co-author of the study. The blueprints obtained by Iran show "distinctive" modifications similar to the ones made by Pakistan, Albright said.

Traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components in Iran indicated they had been used before. Most of the contaminants are of a type of highly enriched uranium believed to be "consistent with material produced in Pakistan," Albright said.

The evidence collectively supports a view widely held among nuclear experts and nonproliferation officials that Iran obtained castoff parts and designs from a centrifuge that was no longer needed by Pakistan, said Gary Samore, a former adviser on nonproliferation on the Clinton administration's National Security Council.

"The particular machine that Iran is using is not the mainstay of the Pakistani program," said Samore, now the director of studies at the Institute for International Strategic Studies in London. "Pakistan had these used aluminum-rotor machines that it no longer needed. The most plausible explanation for what happened is that Pakistan sold its surplus centrifuges, which have now turned up in Iran."

Much of Iran's basic nuclear infrastructure -- from research reactors to lasers used to manipulate uranium atoms -- was supplied by U.S. companies before Islamic revolutionaries deposed the shah in 1979. U.S. officials later discovered that the shah, a staunch U.S. ally, was conducting his own secret nuclear weapons research before he was overthrown.

Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, canceled the shah's contracts with a German company to build nuclear power reactors in Bushehr. But by 1985, during a war with Iraq, Iran reversed course, reopened its nuclear labs and began exploring its options for making enriched uranium and plutonium. It also began looking for new business partners to complete the Bushehr reactor, which had remained frozen since 1979.

Iran's explanation -- that it was only interested in developing nuclear power for electricity -- was greeted with skepticism then and now because Iran sits atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas.

A Big Break


U.S. intelligence officials began detecting attempts by Iran to acquire nuclear-related technology beginning in the mid-1980s. Much of the activity, as U.S. officials understood it at the time, involved Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive technology through legitimate deals with Russian, Chinese and East European companies. The United States sought to use a variety of diplomatic and commercial incentives and punishments to persuade Iran's potential trade partners to abandon projects, ranging from a proposed centrifuge plant to a Russian agreement to complete Iran's nuclear reactors in Bushehr.

"We were very concerned about Russian support of Iran's nuclear activity," said Robert Gallucci, a special envoy on nonproliferation during the Clinton administration and now dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. "At the same time, we were hearing about other activities involving the entire nuclear fuel cycle."

Iran's first big break came in 1987, when it obtained the complete set of designs and parts for gas centrifuges. Around the same time, Iran began receiving technical guidance from foreign experts who steered the country toward some of the same suppliers that had assisted Pakistan's nuclear program years earlier, said Albright, citing information obtained in the IAEA investigation.

"Armed with component specifications and drawings, Iran would be able to design and implement a strategy to develop a reliable centrifuge and create a manufacturing infrastructure to make thousands of centrifuges," Albright wrote in the report. "It would be able to find companies to make centrifuge components, often unwittingly."

Beginning around 1993, Iran launched a broader effort to acquire parts for hundreds of centrifuges, as well as machines and tools to create its own manufacturing center. According to officials familiar with Iran's disclosures to the IAEA, the effort relied on a small group of middlemen from European and Middle Eastern countries who put together orders, made purchases and arranged the shipping.

Iran provided names of a handful of agents to the IAEA, which has since sought to locate and interview them. According to Iran, the middlemen secured a long list of sensitive items, ranging from electronic beam welders and vacuum pumps to shipments of high-strength aluminum and steel that became the raw products for centrifuges.

Some of the shipments were intercepted by U.S. and European intelligence agencies and customs officials. But by the late 1990s, Iran had acquired all the parts it needed for a pilot centrifuge and was preparing to cross another important threshold.

"Iran appears to have secretly achieved self-sufficiency in centrifuge manufacturing," Albright said.

Questions Linger


In early December, there were reports in Pakistan about the disappearance of nuclear scientist Farooq Mohammed, a colleague of Kahn's in the creation of Pakistan's atomic bomb.

First thought to be missing, government officials later confirmed he had been detained by Pakistani security officials for extended questioning. Two subordinates were also picked up, according to a Western official knowledgeable about the incident.

A CIA spokesman denied that any Americans were involved in rounding up the scientists, but other officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the U.S. government was aware of the incident and had been allowed to participate in the questioning. The episode followed what one official described as high-level requests by both the IAEA and the U.S. government for Islamabad to respond to new evidence suggesting that Pakistan's nuclear secrets had been passed to Iran.

Some experts see the detention of the scientists as a hopeful sign, suggesting that Pakistan is preparing to increase its cooperation with IAEA investigators.

"The Pakistanis know the Iranians have fingered them," said Samore, the former adviser on nonproliferation for the Clinton administration. "They know the IAEA is asking questions. This could be the beginning of what Richard Nixon used to call a 'limited hangout' operation."

But other experts see only more obstacles in an already difficult quest for the truth. Doubts are already being voiced regarding whether the IAEA, or anyone, will be able provide definitive answers about Iran's nuclear history and future intentions, said Henry D. Sokolski, a former Defense Department adviser on nonproliferation.

"What is most worrying is not what the Iranians did in the past, but, rather, what they're going to do," said Sokolski, who now directs the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington research organization. "What does our past experience with Iran tell us about the prospects of catching them in a lie in the future?"



© 2003 The XXXXXXX XXXX Company


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 Post subject: The Key Proliferation Questions
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 4:01 pm 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/ Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationID=1487

*****

The Key Proliferation Questions
Proliferation Brief, Volume 7, Number 6
Tuesday, March 23, 2004

The unprecedented pace of proliferation developments the past 18 months makes it difficult for even dedicated experts to keep up. The historic events in Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea have raised several key questions that help frame the proliferation debate over the future direction of U.S. non-proliferation policy: Is proliferation inevitable? Is U.S. intelligence good enough to help prevent proliferation? How should the United States address the main proliferation challenges of today?

Is Proliferation Inevitable?
With all of the attention given to proliferation of late, the general public could reasonably conclude that every small, developing country has a nuclear weapons program. Yet few people appreciate that more countries have abandoned nuclear weapons programs over the past 15 years than have acquired nuclear weapons. Four countries have actually given up considerable nuclear arsenals voluntarily (South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) while only two (Pakistan and North Korea) are thought to have crossed the nuclear finish line. While today's proliferation challenges are real and acute, the track record in uncovering, confronting and reversing proliferation with established tools is actually quite strong.

At any given point over the past 50 years, the outlook for non-proliferation was grim. Officials have predicted widespread nuclear acquisition for decades. Yet in these times, the United States has historically led the international community in preventing this future from coming to pass. The 1950s saw the creation of the international nuclear inspections or safeguard process; the '60s, the birth of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the '70s and 80s, the growth and impact of nuclear arms reductions; the '90s, United States engagement of a new Russia and the securing of its vulnerable nuclear assets. How the United States reacts to current challenges will go a long way in deciding what kind of world develops over the coming years.

Is Our Intelligence Good Enough?
Iraq, the approach to and conduct of the war, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction will cloud the issue of proliferation and intelligence for years. Investigations and intelligence reviews will provide plenty of grist for experts and politicians alike. But in the meantime, the work of intelligence collection and analysis must and does go on and recent history is full of examples where U.S. intelligence successfully alerted policy makers to cases and trends in proliferation. For years, the United States raised concerns (dismissed by many states in Europe and Russia) over Iran's nuclear ambitions that have proven to be true. U.S. intelligence concluded in 2002 that North Korea had a secret uranium program, which Pakistan has now admitted to assisting.

Recent speeches by President Bush and CIA Director George Tenet have made the case that U.S. intelligence cracked Pakistan's connections to Libya, Iran and North Korea and forced A.Q. Kahn's activities into the daylight. In reality, our intelligence has been even better than either the president or Director Tenet have let on. The United States has known about Pakistan's nuclear activities for years, even decades. In most cases, it is not intelligence that let America down, it was America's leaders. In case after case, U.S. intelligence has uncovered proliferation, but other priorities took precedence. The clearest case was in the 1980s, when the United States ignored Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capabilities because it needed Islamabad's help to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. History is repeating itself, now that Pakistan is America's "ally" in the war on terror.

What Do We Do With The Main Proliferation Challenges of Today?
This question is critical and the answer to it will affect the security of the United States for decades. The good news is that we know how to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. Terrorists, unless and until they can produce their own nuclear materials, must look to steal (or buy stolen) weapons-grade uranium or plutonium that exists in national stockpiles. Over the past decade, the United States has invested billions of dollars to help Russia - which possesses the largest and most vulnerable stocks of these materials - keep its weapons and nuclear materials secure. These efforts to improve security are far from complete and are now beginning to expand to other states, but need more political and financial resources to keep ahead of the threats we face.

In addition, the United States has previously stopped or rolled back proliferation by working to remove the demand for nuclear weapons. Regional engagement, conflict prevention, military alliances and the like are as much a part of the non-proliferation history as nuclear seals and Geiger counters.

Lastly, the United States needs to do more hard work in addressing proliferation threats. Washington must reconfigure our policies to demonstrate it understands the nature of this threat and ensure that it takes priority over almost all other security considerations. This includes how the U.S. handles its own nuclear facilities and weapons, the support it provides to organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, how it invests its defense and security budgets, and how the United States prioritizes its relations with other countries.

Despite the challenges we face, proliferation is not inevitable and our knowledge of how and where proliferation takes place is better than most people think. The problem is that officials may not always make non-proliferation the priority it deserves to be.

This piece is based on an editorial that first appeared in the The Hill on March 4, 2004. Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is co-author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction and a former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy.


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 Post subject: Iraq: One Year Later
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 4:27 pm 
George Mason Univ

http://hnn.us/articles/4051.html

Moderator's Note: I posted this for its value as an alternative perspective re the run up to the Iraq War, and possible motives and/or knowledge of the key players.

Schnell I think goes a little over the top on the US global imperalism.

Fortunately for whatever reason this underground nuclear black market of Dr. Kahn's with its close links to radical Islamic extremism has come to light.

*****

3-15-04: News Abroad

Iraq: One Year Later
By Jonathan Schell
Mr. Schell is the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at the Nation Institute and the author of the recently published The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People .


The first anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq has arrived. By now, we were told by the Bush Administration before the war, the flower-throwing celebrations of our troops' arrival would have long ended; their numbers would have been reduced to the low tens of thousands, if not to zero; Iraq's large stores of weapons of mass destruction would have been found and dismantled; the institutions of democracy would be flourishing; Kurd and Shiite and Sunni would be working happily together in a federal system; the economy, now privatized, would be taking off; other peoples of the Middle East, thrilled and awed, so to speak, by the beautiful scenes in Iraq, would be dismantling their own tyrannical regimes. Instead, 530 American soldiers and uncounted thousands of Iraqis, military and civilian, have died; some $149 billion has been expended; no weapons of mass destruction have been found; the economy is a disaster; electricity and water are sometime things; America's former well-wishers, the Shiites, are impatient with the occupation; terrorist bombs are taking a heavy toll; and Iraq as whole, far from being a model for anything, is a cautionary lesson in the folly of imperial rule in the twenty-first century. And yet all this is only part of the cost of the decision to invade and occupy Iraq. To weigh the full cost, one must look not just at the war itself but away from it, at the progress of the larger policy it served, at things that have been done elsewhere-some far from Iraq or deep in the past-and, perhaps above all, at things that have been left undone.

Nuclear Fingerprints

While American troops were dying in Baghdad and Falluja and Samarra, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, was busy making centrifuge parts in Malaysia and selling them to Libya and Iran and possibly other countries. The centrifuges are used for producing bomb-grade uranium. Tahir's project was part of a network set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani atomic bomb. This particular father stole most of the makings of his nuclear offspring from companies in Europe, where he worked during the 1980s. In the 1990s, the thief became a middleman-a fence-immensely enriching himself in the process. In fairness to Khan, we should add that almost everyone who has been involved in developing atomic bombs since 1945 has been either a thief or a borrower. Stalin purloined a bomb design from the United States, courtesy of the German scientist Klaus Fuchs, who worked on the Manhattan Project. China got help from Russia until the Sino-Soviet split put an end to it. Pakistan got secret help from China in the early 1980s. And now it turns out that Khan, among many, many other Pakistanis, almost certainly including the highest members of the government, has been helping Libya, Iran, North Korea and probably others obtain the bomb. That's apparently how Chinese designs-some still in Chinese-were found in Libya when its quixotic leader, Muammar Qaddafi, recently agreed to surrender his country's nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The rest of the designs were in English. Were Klaus Fuchs's fingerprints on them? Only figuratively, because they were "copies of copies of copies," an official said. But such is the nature of proliferation. It is mainly a transfer of information from one mind to another. Copying is all there is to it.

Sometimes, a bit of hardware needs to be transferred, which is where Tahir came in. Indeed, at least seven countries are already known to have been involved in the Pakistani effort, which Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, called a "Wal-Mart" of nuclear technology and an American official called "one-stop shopping" for nuclear weapons. Khan even printed a brochure with his picture on it listing all the components of nuclear weapons that bomb-hungry customers could buy from him. "What Pakistan has done," the expert on nuclear proliferation George Perkovich, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has rightly said, "is the most threatening activity of nuclear proliferation in history. It's impossible to overstate how damaging this is."

Another word for this process of copying would be globalization. Proliferation is merely globalization of weapons of mass destruction. The kinship of the two is illustrated by other details of Tahir's story. The Sri Lankan first wanted to build his centrifuges in Turkey, but then decided that Malaysia had certain advantages. It had recently been seeking to make itself into a convenient place for Muslims from all over the world to do high-tech business. Controls were lax, as befits an export platform. "It's easy, quick, efficient. Do your business and disappear fast, in and out," Karim Raslan, a Malaysian columnist and social commentator, recently told Alan Sipress of the XXXXXXX XXXX . Probably that was why extreme Islamist organizations, including Al Qaeda operatives, had often chosen to meet there. Global terrorism is a kind of globalization, too. The linkup of such terrorism and the world market for nuclear weapons is a specter that haunts the world of the twenty-first century.

The War and Its Aims

But aren't we supposed to be talking about the Iraq war on this anniversary of its launch? We are, but wars have aims, and the declared aim of this one was to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, the President articulated the threat he would soon carry out in Iraq: "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." Later, he said we didn't want the next warning to be "a mushroom cloud." Indeed, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell explicitly ruled out every other justification for the war. Asked about the other reasons, he said, "The President has not linked authority to go to war to any of those elements." When Senator John Kerry explained his vote for the resolution authorizing the war he cited the Powell testimony. Thus not only Bush but also the man likely to be his Democratic challenger in this year's election justified war solely in the name of nonproliferation.

Proliferation, however, is not, as the President seemed to think, just a rogue state or two seeking weapons of mass destruction; it is the entire half-century-long process of globalization that stretches from Klaus Fuchs's espionage to Tahir's nuclear arms bazaar and beyond. The war was a failure in its own terms because weapons of mass destruction were absent in Iraq; the war-policy failed because they were present and spreading in Pakistan. For Bush's warning of a mushroom cloud over an American city, though false with respect to Iraq, was indisputably well-founded in regard to Pakistan's nuclear one-stop-shopping: The next warning stemming from this kind of failure could indeed be a mushroom cloud.

The questions that now cry out to be answered are why did the United States, standing in the midst of the Pakistani nuclear Wal-Mart, its shelves groaning with, among other things, centrifuge parts, uranium hexafluoride (supplied, we now know, to Libya) and helpful bomb-assembly manuals in a variety of languages, rush out of the premises to vainly ransack the empty warehouse of Iraq? What sort of nonproliferation policy could lead to actions like these? How did the Bush Administration, in the name of protecting the country from nuclear danger, wind up leaving the country wide open to nuclear danger?

In answering these questions, it would be reassuring, in a way, to report that the basic facts were discovered only after the war, but the truth is otherwise. In the case of Iraq, it's now abundantly clear that some combination of deception, self-deception and outright fraud (the exact proportions of each are still under investigation) led to the manufacture of a gross and avoidable falsehood. In the months before the war, most of the governments of the world strenuously urged the United States not to go to war on the basis of the flimsy and unconvincing evidence it was offering. In the case of Pakistan, the question of how much the Administration knew before the war has scarcely been asked, yet we know that the most serious breach-the proliferation to North Korea-was reported and publicized before the war.

It's important to recall the chronology of the Korean aspect of Pakistan's proliferation. In January 2003 Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker that Pakistan had given North Korea extensive help with its nuclear program, including its launch of a uranium enrichment process. In return, North Korea was sending guided missiles to Pakistan. In June 2002, Hersh revealed, the CIA had sent the White House a report on these developments. On October 3, 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly confronted the North Koreans with the CIA information, and, according to Kelly, North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister, Kang Suk Ju, startled him by responding, "Of course we have a nuclear program." (Since then, the North Koreans have unconvincingly denied the existence of the uranium enrichment program.)

Bush of course had already named the Pyongyang government as a member of the "axis of evil." It had long been the policy of the United States that nuclearization of North Korea was intolerable. However, the Administration said nothing of the North Korean events to the Congress or the public. North Korea, which now had openly embarked on nuclear armament, and was even threatening to use nuclear weapons, was more dangerous than Saddam's Iraq. Why tackle the lesser problem in Iraq, the members of Congress would have had to ask themselves, while ignoring the greater in North Korea? On October 10, a week after the Kelly visit, the House of Representatives passed the Iraq resolution, and the next day the Senate followed suit. Only five days later, on October 16, did Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, reveal what was happening in North Korea.

In short, from June 2002, when the CIA delivered its report to the White House, until October 16-the period in which the nation's decision to go to war in Iraq was made-the Administration knowingly withheld the news about Korea and its Pakistan connection from the public. Even after the vote, Secretary of State Colin Powell strangely insisted that the North Korean situation was "not a crisis" but only "a difficulty." Nevertheless, he extracted a pledge from Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, that the nuclear technology shipments to North Korea would stop. (They did not.) In March, information was circulating that both Pakistan and North Korea were helping Iran to develop atomic weapons. (The North Korean and Iranian crises are of course still brewing.)

In sum, the glaring contradiction between the policy of "regime change" for already-disarmed Iraq and regime-support for proliferating Pakistan was not a postwar discovery; it was fully visible before the war. The Nation enjoys no access to intelligence files, yet in an article arguing the case against the war, this author was able to comment that an "objective ranking of nuclear proliferators in order of menace" would put "Pakistan first," North Korea second, Iran third, and Iraq only fourth-and to note the curiosity that "the Bush Administration ranks them, of course, in exactly the reverse order, placing Iraq, which it plans to attack, first, and Pakistan, which it befriends and coddles, nowhere on the list." Was nonproliferation, then, as irrelevant to the Administration's aims in Iraq as catching terrorists? Or was protecting the nation and the world against weapons of mass destruction merely deployed as a smokescreen to conceal other purposes? And if so, what were they?

A New Leviathan

The answers seem to lie in the larger architecture of the Bush foreign policy, or Bush Doctrine. Its aim, which many have properly called imperial, is to establish lasting American hegemony over the entire globe, and its ultimate means is to overthrow regimes of which the United States disapproves, pre-emptively if necessary. The Bush Doctrine indeed represents more than a revolution in American policy; if successful, it would amount to an overturn of the existing international order. In the new, imperial order, the United States would be first among nations, and force would be first among its means of domination. Other, weaker nations would be invited to take their place in shifting coalitions to support goals of America's choosing. The United States would be so strong, the President has suggested, that other countries would simply drop out of the business of military competition, "thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace." Much as, in the early modern period, when nation-states were being born, absolutist kings, the masters of overwhelming military force within their countries, in effect said, "There is now a new thing called a nation; a nation must be orderly; we kings, we sovereigns, will assert a monopoly over the use of force, and thus supply that order," so now the United States seemed to be saying, "There now is a thing called globalization; the global sphere must be orderly; we, the sole superpower, will monopolize force throughout the globe, and thus supply international order."

And so, even as the Bush Administration proclaimed US military superiority, it pulled the country out of the world's major peaceful initiatives to deal with global problems-withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol to check global warming and from the International Criminal Court, and sabotaging a protocol that would have given teeth to the biological weapons convention. When the Security Council would not agree to American decisions on war and peace, it became "irrelevant"; when NATO allies balked, they became "old Europe." Admittedly, these existing international treaties and institutions were not a full-fledged cooperative system; rather, they were promising foundations for such a system. In any case, the Administration wanted none of it.

Richard Perle, who until recently served on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, seemed to speak for the Administration in an article he wrote for the Guardian the day after the Iraq war was launched. He wrote, "The chatterbox on the Hudson [sic] will continue to bleat. What will die is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world order. As we sift the debris, it will be important to preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions."

In this larger plan to establish American hegemony, the Iraq war had an indispensable role. If the world was to be orderly, then proliferation must be stopped; if force was the solution to proliferation, then pre-emption was necessary (to avoid that mushroom cloud); if pre-emption was necessary, then regime change was necessary (so the offending government could never build the banned weapons again); and if all this was necessary, then Iraq was the one country in the world where it all could be demonstrated. Neither North Korea nor Iran offered an opportunity to teach these lessons-the first because it was capable of responding with a major war, even nuclear war, and the second because even the Administration could see that US invasion would be met with fierce popular resistance. It's thus no accident that the peril of weapons of mass destruction was the sole justification in the two legal documents by which the Administration sought to legitimize the war-HJR 114 and Security Council Resolution 1441. Nor is it an accident that the proliferation threat played the same role in the domestic political campaign for the war --by forging the supposed link between the "war on terror" and nuclear danger. In short, absent the new idea that proliferation was best stopped by pre-emptive use of force, the new American empire would have been unsalable, to the American people or to Congress. Iraq was the foundation stone of the bid for global empire.

The reliance on force over cooperation that was writ large in the imperial plan was also writ small in the occupation of Iraq. How else to understand the astonishing failure to make any preparation for the political, military, policing and even technical challenges that would face American forces? If a problem, large or small, had no military solution, this Administration seemed incapable of even seeing it. The United States was as blind to the politics of Iraq as it was to the politics of the world.

Thus we don't have to suppose that the Bush officials were indifferent to the spectacular dangers that Kahn's network posed to the safety of the United States and the world or that the Iraqi resistance would pose to American forces. We only have to suppose that they were simply unable to recognize facts they had failed to acknowledge in their overarching vision of a new imperial order. In both cases, ideology trumped reality.

The same pattern is manifest on an even larger scale. Just now, the peoples of the world are embarked, some willingly and some not, on an arduous, wrenching, perilous, mind-exhaustingly complicated process of learning how to live as one indivisibly connected species on our one small, endangered planet. Seen in a certain light, the Administration's imperial bid, if successful, would amount to a kind of planetary coup d'état, in which the world's dominant power takes charge of this process by virtue of its almost freakishly superior military strength. Seen in another, less dramatic light, the American imperial solution has interposed a huge, unnecessary roadblock between the world and the Himalayan mountain range of urgent tasks that it must accomplish no matter who is in charge: saving the planet from overheating; inventing a humane, just, orderly, democratic, accountable global economy; redressing mounting global inequality and poverty; responding to human rights emergencies, including genocide; and, of course, stopping proliferation as well as rolling back the existing arsenals of nuclear arms. None of these exigencies can be met as long as the world and its greatest power are engaged in a wrestling match over how to proceed.

Does the world want to indict and prosecute crimes against humanity? First, it must decide whether the International Criminal Court will do the job or entrust it to unprosecutable American forces. Do we want to reverse global warming, and head off the extinction of the one-third of the world's species that, according to a report published in Nature magazine, are at risk in the next fifty years? First, the world's largest polluter has to be drawn into the global talks. Do we want to save the world from weapons of mass destruction? First, we have to decide whether we want to do it together peacefully or permit the world's only superpower to attempt it by force of arms.

No wonder, then, that the Administration, as reported by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in these pages, has mounted an assault on the scientific findings that confirm these dangers to the world [see "The Junk Science of George W. Bush," March 8]. The United States' destructive hyperactivity in Iraq cannot be disentangled from its neglect of global warming. Here, too, ideology is the enemy of fact, and empire is the nemesis of progress.

If the engine of a train suddenly goes off the rails, a wreck ensues. Such is the war in Iraq, now one year old. At the same time, the train's journey forward is canceled. Such is the current paralysis of the international community. Only when the engine is back on the tracks and starts in the right direction can either disaster be overcome. Only then will everyone be able to even begin the return to the world's unfinished business.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This article first appeared in the Nation and on http://www.tomdispatch.com, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news and opinion from Tom Engelhardt, a long time editor in publishing, the author of The End of Victory Culture, and a fellow of the Nation Institute.


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 Post subject: Bush didn't lie
PostPosted: Wed Jul 14, 2004 10:46 pm 
The Jerusalem Post

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? ... 6953079865

*****

Bush didn't lie
Mark Steyn Jul. 14, 2004

Do you remember a year ago when the Democratic National Committee was putting out press releases headlined "President Bush Deceives The American People"?

Yawn. What's new? But last summer the Bush Lie of the Week was all to do with Saddam's trying to buy uranium from Niger. CNN and co. replayed endlessly the critical 16 words from the president's 2003 State of the Union Address: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Sixteen words that could break a presidency! Bush "misled every one of us," huffed Senator John Kerry. "It's beginning to sound like Watergate," said Governor Howard Dean. Joseph C. Wilson IV, the man the CIA sent to Africa to investigate, wrote a piece for The New York Times titled "What I Didn't Find in Africa."

Can you guess what he didn't find, dear reader? That's right, he didn't find a big package of uranium bearing the address label "S. Hussein, Suite 27, the Saddam Hussein Center for Armageddon Studies, Saddam Hussein Parkway, Baghdad."
Ambassador Wilson said relax, he'd been to Niger, spent "eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people," and there's nothing going on.

Well, last Friday in Washington, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report confirmed that both British and French intelligence had informed the US separately of Iraq's efforts in Niger (the country's uranium operations are under the supervision of the French Atomic Energy Commission) and that, despite his protestations to the contrary, even Joe Wilson had discovered evidence of Iraq-Niger contacts. Today in London, Lord Butler will publish his report into the quality of the intelligence on which rested Britain's case for going to war with Iraq. The report is said to be critical of some of Tony Blair's claims, supportive of others. And, among the latter, he says that the statements about Iraq and Niger are justified and supported by the intelligence.

In other words, the British government did learn that Saddam Hussein did seek significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

As a gazillion e-mails a day shrieked from my inbox back then, "BUSH LIED!!!!!!" So where exactly in that State of the Union observation is the lie? The only bona fide liar in this whole affair would seem to be the preening mediocrity Joseph C. Wilson IV, who lied to his New York Times readers about what he found in Africa and explicitly lied when he insisted that his wife, CIA employee Valerie Plame, was not the one who got him the gig. (He said she had nothing to do with it; the Senate investigation has uncovered her memo recommending him.)

Last summer, the comparatively minor matter of uranium from Niger was all over the front pages and the news shows. Do you think these latest developments will be? Will John Kerry and Howard Dean be eating humble yellowcake? Not to judge from The XXXXXXX XXXX, which buried its revised account of these events deep inside the paper, or The New York Times, which at the time of this writing has shown no interest in the exposure of its sometime pundit, Wilson, as a complete fraud.

I FIRST wrote about this business in July last year. The CIA had disowned the Niger story, and I pointed out that these were the same fellows who'd botched the Sudanese aspirin factory bombing, failed to spot 9/11 coming, etc, etc. "So," I continued, "if you're the president and the same intelligence bureaucrats who got all the above wrong, say the Brits are way off the mark, there's nothing going on with Saddam and Africa, what do you do? Do you say, 'Hey, even a stopped clock is right twice a day'? Or, given what you've learnt about the state of your humint (human intelligence), is it likely they've got much of a clue about what's going on in French Africa? Isn't this one of those deals where the Brits and the shifty French are more plugged in?"

And so it's proved. The fact is almost every European intelligence service reckoned Saddam was trying to buy uranium in Africa. The only folks who didn't think so were the CIA.

Let's weigh their comparative interest in the story. The Financial Times revealed last week that one continental intelligence agency had had a uranium-smuggling operation involving Iraq under surveillance for three years. In return, the only primary investigation initiated by the most powerful nation on the face of the Earth was to send a narcissistic kook from a Saudi-funded think tank on vacation for a week to sip mint tea with government stooges. Joe Wilson declared he didn't even bother filing a written report, and the "Bush spurned my advice!" column he wrote for The New York Times reads like a bad travelogue: "Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger river."

After that, the great narcissist took to the talk-show circuit and somehow managed to make himself the center of the story – But hey, enough about Saddam's nuclear ambitions; let's talk about me.

A few weeks before 9/11, Reuel Marc Gerecht wrote a timely piece in The Atlantic Monthly on the woeful state of US counter-terrorism intelligence in a CIA neutered by politically correct bureaucracy. Among Gerecht's many memorable quotes was this line from a young CIA man reflecting on an agency grown used to desk-bound life in Virginia: "Operations that include diarrhea as a way of life don't happen." That's Niger in a nutshell: Diarrhea Central. Who'd want to be stationed there when they could be back at Langley monitoring the world's e-mail in an air-conditioned office?

But Niger is a 99.5% Sunni Muslim country with a load of uranium. It's exactly the sort of place an intelligence agency in the war on terror ought to be keeping an eye on. And that doesn't mean sending Mint Tea Boy to write it up for the travel section.

That's the issue here: The CIA are tourists in the heart of darkness.

Bush didn't lie! He was right, and the CIA were wrong. That doesn't mean they lied, either. Intelligence is never 100%. You make a judgment, and in this instance the judgments of the British and Europeans were correct, and the judgment of the principal intelligence agency of the world's hyperpower was way off. Something is badly awry at the CIA, and that should be a cause of great concern – for all Americans.

National security shouldn't be a Republican/Democrat thing. But it's become one because, for too many Americans, when it's a choice between Bush and anybody else, they'll take anybody else. So, in Fahrenheit 9/11, if it's a choice between Bush and Saddam, Michael Moore comes down on the side of the genocidal whacko and shows us lyrical slo-mo shots of kiddies flying kites in a Ba'athist utopia. In the Afghan war, if it's a choice between Bush and the women-enslaving Taliban, Susan Sarandon and co. side with the Taliban.

And in the most exquisite reductio of this now universal rule, if it's a choice between Bush and the CIA, the Left sides with the CIA. There's one for the peace marches: Hey, hey, CIA/How many Bush lies did you expose today? This isn't an anti-war movement. This is a movement in denial.

The writer is senior contributing editor for Hollinger Inc.

This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? ... 6953079865

Copyright 1995-2004 The Jerusalem Post - http://www.jpost.com/


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 Post subject: Al-Qaida Has Nuclear Weapons Inside U.S.
PostPosted: Thu Jul 15, 2004 2:23 pm 
NEWSMAX

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/article ... 1536.shtml

Moderator's Note: Yes I know this source is not the best. This story has been floating around out there for some time. Since there was again a mention to the notorious Dr. Kahn, I thought I would post it here.

*****

Author: Al-Qaida Has Nuclear Weapons Inside U.S.
Stewart Stogel, NewsMax.com
Wednesday, July 14, 2004

A new book written by a former FBI consultant claims that al-Qaida not only has obtained nuclear devices, but also likely has them in the U.S. and will detonate them in the near future.


These chilling allegations appear in "Osama's Revenge: The Next 9/11: What the Media and the Government Haven't Told You," by Paul L. Williams (Prometheus Books).

Williams claims that al-Qaida has been planning a spectacular nuclear attack using six or seven suitcase nuclear bombs that would be detonated simulantaneously in U.S. cities.


"They want the most bang for the buck, and that is nuclear," Williams told NewsMax.

"I expect such an attack would come between now and the end of 2005," the author said.

In addition to writing several books on terrorism, Williams, an investigative journalist, has worked as an FBI consultant.

Williams' contention is not far from what U.S. intelligence believes, a source close to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge has told NewsMax. The source said Ridge claimed that U.S. intelligence believes terrorists already have smuggled into the U.S. actual atomic devices, as opposed to so-called "dirty nukes" that simply are conventional bombs that help spread radiation.


The Bush administration has warned for years that terrorists pose a nuclear threat to America.


Williams' book presents a review of the increasing spread of nuclear weapons technology, which the author says can be traced to India's nuclear tests in the early 1970s. It accelerated when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.


Shortly after the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan made an all-out effort to join the nuclear club, the author says. Islamabad received help from sympathetic nations, namely China and North Korea.


Williams traces the rampant spread of nuclear bomb development to a leading Pakistani scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Khan, described as an "Islamic extremist," also has been depicted by former CIA chief George Tenet as "the father of Pakistan's nuclear program."

It is believed the Pakistani gained his expertise while working in the Netherlands, where he allegedly stole technology used in uranium reprocessing, a key procedure for building an atomic bomb.

Pakistan successfully detonated two nuclear weapons inside a northern mountain range in the late 1990s.


Khan, arrested by Pakistani police in February under White House pressure, admitted selling nuclear technology to numerous foreign countries, including North Korea and Libya.

Williams reports that Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was investigating Khan at the time he was kidnapped and later killed in 2003.


Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, fearing a backlash from radical Muslims, granted Khan a pardon but restricted his travels.


According to Williams, another beneficiary of Khan's "contacts" was al-Qaida. The author reports that the U.S. got its first "hard" evidence of a connection when it invaded the Afghan capital of Kabul in 2001.

A former al-Qaida safe house was found to be loaded with documents detailing dealings with the Pakistani scientist.


The finding was so serious, says Williams, that Tenet traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to follow up on the discovery.


Tenet: 'They Are Coming'


Perhaps it was such intelligence that led Tenet to say in October 2002: "The threat environment we face is as bad as it was before September 11. It is serious. They have reconstituted. They are coming after us."


Almost from the moment 9/11 happened, the U.S. has been on a heightened state of alert and worry over the possible use of nuclear weapons. On the day of the attack, President Bush left Florida and began criss-crossing the country in Air Force One in maneuvers consistent with a president preparing for a nuclear attack.

Shortly after Sept. 11, Taliban leader Mullah Omar claimed to the BBC that the main intent of al-Qaida was the "bigger cause," which he described as the "destruction of America."

Asked pointedly if this meant the use of nuclear weapons againt the U.S., he responded: "This is not a matter of weapons. We are hopeful for God's help. The real matter is the extinction of America. And, God willing, it will fall to the ground."

Omar cryptically suggested that a nuclear plan was already under way at the time of Sept. 11.

He said: "The plan is going ahead and, God willing, it is being implemented. But it is a huge task, which is beyond the will and comprehension of human beings. If God's help is with us, this will happen within a short period of time; keep in mind this prediction."


The Russian Connection


The author points out that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made matters worse:

"The Chechen Mafia reportedly sold twenty nuclear suitcases in Grozny to representatives of Osama bin Laden and the Mujahadeen [in 1996]. For their weapons, bin Laden paid $30 million in cash and two tons of heroin."

Al-Qaida's leader, says Williams, is a major drug producer and runner in Afghanistan.

"It is the drug money, not the bin Laden family fortune, that is the financial engine for al-Qaida," he points out.

Today, Williams says, more than 40 Russian "nuclear suitcases" cannot be accounted for.

The suitcases are miniaturized tactical nuclear bombs (in some cases weighing less than 40 pounds) that originally were planned by the Cold War-era Kremlin to be detonated inside the U.S. in the event of war.

Most could cause damage equal to or greater than the crude device Washington dropped on Hiroshima during World War II.

The author says some of these weapons still remain stateside in a "sleeper" status controlled by Russian military officials who believe a war with the U.S. "is still possible."

Others, as many as 10, might be under al-Qaida's control, says Williams.


What kind of damage could such a weapon do? The CIA estimates the Russian nuclear suitcases to have an explosive yield approaching 10 kilotons.


Williams, referring to estimates by Theodore Taylor, a prominent American physicist who miniaturized the atomic bomb and visited the site of the World Trade Center in 1993, says a suitcase bomb could "emit intense thermal radiation, creating a fireball with a diameter that would expand to 460 feet. The core of the fireball would reach a maximum temperature of 10 million degrees Celsius ... ." The author says the heat that collapsed the Twin Towers never exceeded 5,000 degrees Celsius.


Had such a bomb been used in 9/11, Williams claims, "The World Trade Center towers, all of Wall Street and the financial district, along with the lower tip of Manhattan up to Gramercy Park and much of midtown, including the theater district, would lie in ruins."


Of those who might survive the blast, 50 percent of the survivors could expect to die at the rate of "250,000 people on any given day," Williams reports.


And how could al-Qaida manage to transport such weapons into the U.S.?

Williams points out that the borders with Mexico and Canada are still dangerously porous and not equipped to detect the smuggling of nuclear materials.

U.S. seaports are even more vulnerable, he argues.

Though New York City would seem to be the No. 1 target of another attack by al-Qaida, Williams points out other U.S. cities have been mentioned in intercepted intelligence chatter.

Among those discussed: Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, Miami, Washington and Rappahannock County, Va.

Why a small rural county in Virginia? Williams says it houses the underground command center the White House would use in time of war.

He hastens to add that time "may not be on our side."

"It was eight years between the World Trade Center attacks. Islam preaches patience. They will attack when they want," Williams concluded.

More chilling was the response from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog.

One official, speaking on background, told NewsMax: "We have no comment. It is not within our responsibility to track atomic bombs."

Urgent: Read the whole story in Paul L. Williams' "Osama's Revenge: The Next 9/11: What the Media and the Government Haven't Told You."


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 Post subject: Wilson contradictions leave Democrat senators speechless
PostPosted: Thu Jul 15, 2004 4:46 pm 
http://www.suntimes.com

http://www.suntimes.com/output/novak/cs ... vak15.html

*****

[Yellow Cake]

Wilson contradictions leave Democrat senators speechless

July 15, 2004

BY ROBERT NOVAK SUN-TIMES COLUMNIST

Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not bark, the most remarkable aspect of last week's Senate Intelligence Committee report is what its Democratic members did not say. They did not dissent from the committee's findings that Iraq apparently asked about buying yellowcake uranium from Niger. They neither agreed to a conclusion that former diplomat Joseph Wilson was suggested for a mission to Niger by his CIA employee wife nor defended his statements to the contrary.

Wilson's activities constituted the only aspects of the yearlong investigation for which the committee's Republican chairman, Sen. Pat Roberts, was unable to win unanimous agreement. According to committee sources, Roberts felt Wilson had been such a ''cause celebre'' for Democrats that they could not face the facts about him.

For a year, Democrats have been belaboring President Bush about 16 words in his 2003 State of the Union address in which he reported Saddam Hussein's attempt to buy uranium from Africa, based on British information. Wilson has been lionized in liberal circles for allegedly contradicting this information on a CIA mission and then being punished as a truth-teller. Now, for committee Democrats, it is as though the Niger question and Joe Wilson have vanished from the Earth.

Because a Justice Department special prosecutor is investigating whether any crime was committed when my column first identified Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, as a CIA employee, on advice of counsel I have not written on the subject since October. However, I feel compelled to describe how the committee report treats the Niger-Wilson affair because it has received scant coverage except in a few media outlets. The unanimously approved report said, ''interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD (CIA counterproliferation division) employee, suggested his name for the trip.'' That's what I reported, and what Wilson flatly denied and still does.

Plame sent out an internal CIA memo saying ''my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.'' A State Department analyst told the committee about an inter-agency meeting in 2002 that was ''apparently convened by [Wilson's] wife, who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue.''

The committee found that the CIA report, based on Wilson's mission, differed considerably from the former ambassador's description to the committee of his findings. That report ''did not refute the possibility that Iraq had approached Niger to purchase uranium.'' As far as his statement to the XXXXXXX XXXX about ''forged documents'' involved in the alleged Iraqi attempt to buy uranium, Wilson told the committee he may have ''misspoken.'' In fact, the intelligence community agreed that ''Iraq was attempting to procure uranium from Africa.''

''While there was no dispute with the underlying facts,'' Chairman Roberts wrote separately, ''my Democrat colleagues refused to allow'' two conclusions in the report. The first conclusion merely said that Wilson was sent to Niger at his wife's suggestion. The second conclusion is devastating: ''Rather than speaking publicly about his actual experiences during his inquiry of the Niger issue, the former ambassador seems to have included information he learned from press accounts and from his beliefs about how the Intelligence Community would have or should have handled the information he provided.''

The normally mild Roberts is harsh in his condemnation: ''Time and again, Joe Wilson told anyone who would listen that the president had lied to the American people, that the vice president had lied, and that he had 'debunked' the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. . . . [N]ot only did he NOT 'debunk' the claim, he actually gave some intelligence analysts even more reason to believe that it may be true.'' Roberts called it ''important'' for the committee to declare much of what Wilson said ''had no basis in fact.'' In response, Democrats were silent.

Copyright © The Sun-Times Company
All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.


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 Post subject: Syria says UN nuclear inspectors welcome
PostPosted: Sat Jul 17, 2004 8:00 am 
REUTERS

http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArt ... ction=news

*****

Syria says UN nuclear inspectors welcome
Sat June 26, 2004 03:16 PM ET

By Louis Charbonneau

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Syria has told the U.N. nuclear watchdog that its inspectors are welcome to come and verify the nature of its atomic activities, the agency's chief says.

"The Syrians told me they would be happy if we go and verify whatever we need to verify," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters on Saturday during a flight to Moscow for a four-day official visit. "But we haven't gotten any piece of information on why we should be concerned about Syria."

Last week, diplomats told Reuters that the IAEA considered Damascus a top candidate for being the fourth customer of the nuclear black market that supplied uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

But ElBaradei said no country had provided any hard evidence that would implicate Syria as a customer in the black market set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic weapons programme.

"This is something I read in the paper. Nobody came to us with any information (about Syria)," ElBaradei said.

The IAEA, along with governments and intelligence agencies, has been investigating the details of Khan's network so that it can be dismantled. The results of the investigation are classified.

Syria, which has called for the creation of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, has denied any interest in nuclear weapons.

Last month, diplomats and nuclear experts told Reuters that an experimental high-tech intelligence technique developed by the United States had detected what appear to be operating uranium-enrichment centrifuges in Syria.

Diplomats said the centrifuges, which spin at supersonic speeds to purify uranium for use as fuel for power plants or weapons, could only have come from Khan's network.

But some U.S. officials -- as well as ElBaradei -- are sceptical about the centrifuges.

"We don't have super high-tech detectors, and if somebody detected something they'd better come to us. We are the ones who can clarify fact from fiction," ElBaradei said.

© Reuters 2004. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters and the Reuters sphere logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Reuters group of companies around the world.


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 Post subject: Iraqi Optimists vs. U.S. Pessimists
PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2004 10:57 pm 
Mod

Joined: Tue Feb 03, 2004 11:07 pm
Posts: 534
FrontPageMagazine.com

http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadAr ... p?ID=14051

*****

Iraqi Optimists vs. U.S. Pessimists
By Larry Elder
FrontPageMagazine.com | July 5, 2004

A majority of Americans, according to a recent poll, now call going into Iraq a mistake. Many Iraqis apparently failed to get the memo.

A poll commissioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority found 63 percent of Iraqis expect conditions to improve after the takeover of the interim government. Four years ago, Iraq's unemployment rate stood between 60 and 75 percent. The current estimated rate is now at approximately 30 percent -- high by our standards, but a dramatic decline since the fall of Saddam's regime.

What about those purported non-existent links between terrorism, al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein? Some of the press enthusiastically reported that the 9/11 commission found no "link" or "collaborative relationship" between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. But the commission -- only charged with investigating the 9/11 attacks -- actually said, "We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States (emphasis added)."

About connections between al Qaeda, terrorism and Saddam, The New York Times recently wrote: "Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents and Osama bin Laden when he was in Sudan in the mid-1990s were part of a broad effort by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing the Saudi ruling family, according to a newly disclosed document obtained by the Americans in Iraq."

The Weekly Standard's Stephen Hayes, in his new book, The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America, explores many Iraq/al Qaeda links, including:

"The al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in the late 1990s linked to both al Qaeda and Iraq as a front for producing chemical weapons -- according to the testimony of six senior Clinton administration officials . . .

"Photographs . . . placing Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, a suspected Iraqi intelligence operative, at key planning meetings with al Qaeda members for the bombing of the USS Cole and the Sept. 11 attacks . . .

"Official records . . . prove that Saddam's regime harbored Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who mixed the chemicals for the 1993 World Trade Center attack -- the first al Qaeda attack on U.S. soil . . ."

What about the Jordanian interception of 20 tons of chemicals, including VX and sarin, brought in from Syria by an al Qaeda cell? Remember, former weapons hunter David Kay said, "We know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program." Terrorism expert John Loftus said that the terrorists caught entering Jordan probably intended to kill as many as 80,000. "Syria does not make VX nerve gas," says Loftus, "only Saddam Hussein did." Loftus also said, "There's no doubt these guys confessed on Jordanian television that they received the training for this mission in Iraq."

Former Clinton CIA Director R. James Woolsey believes that Iraqi WMD-related material "probably" entered Syria months before the war. Woolsey also notes that Iraq admitted making 8.5 tons of anthrax, which -- reduced to powder -- could fill a dozen easily portable suitcases, and that "Iraq's ties with terrorist groups in the '90s are clear . . . with a decade of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, including training in poisons, gases and explosives. There was no need to show that Iraq participated in 9/11 . . . describing occasional cooperation of the sort that is well chronicled was quite sufficient."

What about the discovery in Iraq of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) tipped with sarin gas, and another with mustard gas? What about Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent public statement that he warned the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein intended to attack America! "After the events of Sept. 11, 2001, and before the start of the military operation in Iraq, Russian special services several times (emphasis added) received information that the official services of the Saddam regime were preparing 'terrorist acts' on the United States . . ." said Putin. "This information was passed on to our American colleagues."

Osama bin Laden, in 1996, issued a fatwa in which he called it the individual duty of every Muslim to kill American military personnel abroad. His 1998 fatwa added civilian targets: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilian and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it." When asked, bin Laden later elaborated on using WMD: " . . . Acquiring (chemical and nuclear) weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty."

Yet many Americans believe the following: America went into Iraq for oil; Bush lied to build the case for war; Bush drove us into war to benefit his rich friends in Halliburton; and the war in Iraq diverts our attention and resources from the war on terror.

Fortunately, the president correctly and boldly recognizes Iraq as an important front in the War on Terror. Stay the course, Mr. President.

_________________
Ron Wright,
Board of Advisors, Security Council Member,
http://WWW.HSPIG.ORG


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 Profile  
 
 Post subject: Post subject: "THE" Reason We Went Into Iraq
PostPosted: Thu Aug 12, 2004 7:52 am 
Mod

Joined: Tue Feb 03, 2004 11:07 pm
Posts: 534
FREE REPUBLIC.COM

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1140929/posts

Moderator's Comment: This is a thread on WMD that hasn't surfaced on major media outlets other than a brief appearence on FOXNEWS. Apparently there is no transcript of this show on the FOX site (I did a quick check and couldn't fine it). The following is a transcript from a video tape by the poster below.

John Loftus was the guest on the Larry Elder program posted above.

I haven't had time to vett this but if true would go a long way to explain some widely divergent dots - Russians warning Iraq to move their nerve gas, nerve gas intercepted on way to attack in Jordan recently, Syrians among the dead in the North Korean train explosion (and quite an explosion that was! - see previous posts on this), and Khadafy's sudden case of religion and spilling his guts on WMDs underground railround procurement channels.

*****

"THE" Reason We Went Into Iraq
Inside Scoop - Fox News Channel ^ | Sunday, 5-23-2004 | Eric Shawn & John Loftus

Posted on 05/23/2004 3:53:42 PM PDT by Matchett-PI
Edited on 05/23/2004 5:21:43 PM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]

Host Eric Shawn

Guest: John Loftus (the author of four histories about Intelligence operations, a consultant for CBS 60 MINUTES and ABC - PRIME TIME, among others. He was a prosecutor with the U.S. Justice Department Nazi hunting unit with unprecedented access to top secret C.I.A. and NATO archives)

Under discussion is this story in the NY Times today:

Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium New York Times ^ | 5/23/04 | DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD

Excerpt transcribed by me from my videotape:

Eric Shawn: "John Loftus told us about it months ago right here on Inside Scoop. John, that's why we call it, 'Inside Scoop' - you beat the New York Times again. Congratulations!"

John Loftus: "Thank you very much."

Eric: "How do you do it?"

John: "Well, ummm, this little country lawyer used to have a Q clearance for nuclear weapons secrets and I was told about this amazing wiretap where British Intelligence overheard a call from North Korea to Libya saying, 'My god, if the Americans ever go into Iraq, they're going to find out about our nuclear program. And who's going to pay all the Iraqi nuclear scientists in Libya if Saddam falls?''"

Eric: "You're saying before the war there were Iraqi nuclear scientists working on a potential bomb in Libya before we launched this [war in Iraq]?

John: "Yeah. This was a treaty signed by a man called Ali Sobree (sp?). He was the foreign minister of Iraq. And he went to Khadafy and they worked out a whole protocol. Khadafy would donate a hollowed out mountain in Libya; Iraq would provide the nuclear scientists, and North Korea would provide the uranium. And they would literally make a factory for nuclear weapons. And once that factory was complete, we had lost the war on terrorism. People don't realize that even a small nuclear weapon can kill 300,000 people. That's one hundred 9-11's. So that's why we put [garbled] bin Laden on the back burner -- we were really focusing on getting the Ali Sobree protocol - we had to smash that ring."

Eric: "Now when you talk about Saddam and the war on terror - we've had conversations - your indication is that President Bush understood this after 9-11 and he was mostly concerned about a nuclear bomb from Libya or Iraq or Iran."

John: "Eric, that's EXACTLY it. Within a month after 9-11, British wiretaps showed that we had a MAJOR risk. Nuclear weapons in terrorist's hands would be devastating. And that's why the president said, 'OK, we're gonna shift the emphasis from Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden. We're gonna go into Iraq - that's where the evidence is - we have to capture Ali Sobree."

Eric: "Yeah, but critics say, 'Oh the war is about oil' - ' The war is about democracy'. You say there's someting else going on. ..."

John: "This is absolutely necessary, Eric. Had we not smashed the program, within the next 3 or 4 months - on the schedule they were on - Libya would have finished the nuclear factory - we couldn't touch it. We were designing nuclear bunker-busters to try and get into the mountain [but] even that wouldn't work. Once the Islamic bomb was finished - America - the rest of the western nations were finished. We couldn't stand city after city evaporating by nuclear weapons."

Eric: "In other words, going into Iraq, in your view, having Khadafy now basically give up and surrender everything to us, getting the connection to North Korea and Iran - was a major strategy in the war on terror?"

John: "It was THE major strategy. Khadafy has now confirmed he is going to hand the Ali Sobree protocols over to the United States. Sobree, himself, is now in US custody and he is already scheduled as one of the first three witnesses in the trial of Saddam Hussein.

Sadam's biggest crime? While he was starving his own people to death, his money and his scientists were hiding in Libya to make a factory for nuclear weapons to attack any major power in the world." ...

Excerpted - click for full article ^
Source: http://www.foxnews.com
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 Post subject: Saddam agents on Syria border helped move banned materials
PostPosted: Mon Aug 16, 2004 3:32 pm 
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The Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com

http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040 ... -4438r.htm

****

Saddam agents on Syria border helped move banned materials

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published August 16, 2004

Saddam Hussein periodically removed guards on the Syrian border and replaced them with his own intelligence agents who supervised the movement of banned materials between the two countries, U.S. investigators have discovered.

The recent discovery by the Bush administration's Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is fueling speculation, but is not proof, that the Iraqi dictator moved prohibited weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into Syria before the March 2003 invasion by a U.S.-led coalition.

Two defense sources told The Washington Times that the ISG has interviewed Iraqis who told of Saddam's system of dispatching his trusted Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to the border, where they would send border inspectors away.

The shift was followed by the movement of trucks in and out of Syria suspected of carrying materials banned by U.N. sanctions. Once the shipments were made, the agents would leave and the regular border guards would resume their posts.

"If you leave it to border guards, then the border guards could stop the trucks and extract their 10 percent, just like the mob would do," said a Pentagon official who asked not to be named. "Saddam's family was controlling the black market, and it was a good opportunity for them to make money."

Sources said Saddam and his family grew rich from this black market and personally dispatched his dreaded intelligence service to the border to make sure the shipments got through.

The ISG is a 1,400-member team organized by the Pentagon and CIA to hunt for Saddam's suspected stockpiles of WMD, such as chemical and biological agents. So far, the search has failed to find such stockpiles, which were the main reason for President Bush ordering the invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam.

But there is evidence of unusually heavy truck traffic into Syria in the days before the attack, and with it, speculation that some of the trucks contained the banned weapons.

"Of course, it's always suspicious," the Pentagon official said.

The source said the ISG has confirmed the practice of IIS agents going to the border. Investigators also have heard from Iraqi sources that this maneuver was done days before the war at a time of brisk cross-border movements.

That particular part of the disclosures has not been positively confirmed, the officials said, although it dovetails with Saddam's system of switching guards at a time when contraband was shipped.

The United States spotted the heavy truck traffic via satellite imagery before the war. But spy cameras cannot look through truck canopies, and the ISG has not been able to determine whether any weapons were sent to Syria for hiding.

In an interview in October, retired Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper Jr., who heads the U.S. agency that processes and analyzes satellite imagery, said he thinks that Saddam's underlings hid banned weapons of mass destruction before the war.

"I think personally that those below the senior leadership saw what was coming, and I think they went to some extraordinary lengths to dispose of the evidence," said Gen. Clapper, who heads the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. "I'll call it an 'educated hunch.' "

He added, "I think probably in the few months running up prior to the onset of combat that I think there was probably an intensive effort to disperse into private homes, move documentation and materials out of the country. I think there are any number of things that they would have done."

Of activity on the Syrian border, Gen. Clapper said, "There is no question that there was a lot of traffic, increase in traffic up to the immediate onset of combat and certainly during Iraqi Freedom. ... The obvious conclusion one draws is the sudden upturn, uptick in traffic which may have been people leaving the scene, fleeing Iraq and unquestionably, I'm sure, material as well."

He also said, "Based on what we saw prior to the onset of hostilities, we certainly felt there were indications of WMD activity. ... Actually knowing what is going on inside a building is quite a different thing than, say, this facility may well be a place where there may be WMD."

The Iraq Survey Group, which periodically briefs senior officials and Congress, is due to deliver its next report in September. In addition to interviewing hundreds of Iraqis, the ISG has collected and cataloged millions of pages of documents, not all of which have been fully examined.

Although Syria and Iraq competed for influence in the region, they shared the same Ba'athist socialist ideology and maintained close ties at certain government levels. The United States accused Syria during the war of harboring some of Saddam's inner circle.




Copyright © 2004 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.

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 Post subject: U.N. Report Leaves Open Possibility of N. Korean Nuclear Tec
PostPosted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 9:45 am 
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AP News

http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGBV7S1TIYD.html

*****

Confidential U.N. Report Leaves Open Possibility of N. Korean Nuclear Technology Supplies to Libya

By George Jahn Associated Press Writer
Published: Aug 30, 2004

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Diplomats on Monday said a report by the U.N. nuclear watchdog did not rule out North Korean involvement in supplying Libya with banned technology for its weapons program.
In a restricted report made available to The Associated Press the International Atomic Energy Agency also said that some of the equipment ordered by Libya as part of its weapons program remains missing, raising concerns that other countries or groups might have secretly received it.

The IAEA began circulating the report to diplomats ahead of a meeting of the agency's board of governors starting Sept. 13 that will review the progress of investigating secret nuclear activities by Libya and Iran.

The Iran report is expected to be released to diplomats in the next few days. While Iran denies accusations by the United States and others that its nuclear program is geared toward making weapons, Libya went public about its weapons programs in December and pledged then to scrap them.

In the report being circulated Monday, the agency credited Libya with cooperation in efforts to get to the bottom of its activities but said some questions remained outstanding.

Among them, the report focused on the origin of two cylinders of uranium hexaflouride, which is introduced into centrifuges and spun to enrich it. Uranium enriched to 90 percent or above is known as weapons grade, and is used in the manufacture of warheads.

The report confirmed that uranium hexaflouride was bought in 2000 "from a foreign supplier" but made no conclusion of where the substance originated from.

A senior diplomat familiar with the Libyan investigation said that indicated that the agency remained uncertain about whether the uranium hexaflouride was purchased on the black market from Pakistan or North Korea.

While Pakistan was the source of much of the enrichment technology peddled by the black market network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, both Pakistan and North Korea have been mentioned by experts as possible sources of origin for the uranium hexaflouride found in Libya.

"If it's North Korea, its obviously disturbing," said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "That means that North Korea was a member of the proliferator group, and so far we only knew of ... Pakistan."

North Korea admitted in 2002 to running a secret nuclear program in violation of international agreements. The isolated communist nation subsequently broke all agreements with the IAEA that had allowed outside monitoring of some of its programs.

On the missing equipment, the report said investigations continue on enrichment technology "destined for Libya ... (that) never arrived."

The diplomat said the investigations focused on whether the equipment "ended up in the hands of another country or its sitting on a dock somewhere and was never shipped."

"This is one of the big questions," said the diplomat. "Where did the other stuff go."

While the agency has not found any indications that weapons-related technology has been sold by the nuclear network to terrorists, another diplomat said nothing could be discounted until all shipments sold on the black market had been accounted for.

AP-ES-08-30-04 1207EDT

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 Post subject: Syria’s Worst Kept Secret?
PostPosted: Sun Sep 19, 2004 7:14 pm 
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Blogs of War

http://www.blogsofwar.com/archives/2004 ... pt-secret/

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9/19/2004
Syria’s Worst Kept Secret?

* Iraq
* Syria

— John Little

An interesting comment from a Syrian reader:

I am a Syrian citizen and I am sure that a cooperation was going on between Syria and Iraq long before the liberation of Iraq concerning WMDs and I am sure that all the scientists and weapon were smuggled to Syria a short time before the liberation. Everybody in the north of Syria knows this fact but wont tell about it.

I checked this reader’s IP address and it does trace back to the STE (Syrian Telecommunications Establishment).

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 Post subject: Iraq’s WMDs: Lost and Found
PostPosted: Wed Oct 27, 2004 11:32 am 
National Review Online

http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/r ... 270816.asp

*****
October 27, 2004, 8:16 a.m.
Iraq’s WMDs: Lost and Found
Saddam had ’em.
By James S. Robbins

Wait a minute — so there were WMDs in Iraq? The Kerry campaign, the media, assorted pundits, and others are making much of the disappearance of the 380 tons of explosives from the Al Qaqaa storage facility south of Baghdad. According to the IAEA, the U.N. watchdog agency now apparently in the service of the Democratic National Committee, some of the explosives could be used to detonate nuclear weapons. Wow — nuclear-weapon components were in Iraq? Shouldn't the headline be, "Saddam Had 'Em?"

The opposition really needs to get its story straight. The president cannot be taken to task for inventing the Iraqi WMD threat, and simultaneously disparaged for not securing Saddam's dangerous WMD-related materials.

The cache at al Qaqaa was not the only WMD-related material in the news recently. Another IAEA report came out two weeks ago that did not get as much play. According to this account, dual-use equipment that could be used to make nuclear weapons was taken from various locations inside Iraq. The Duelfer Report speculated this equipment could have been taken during the chaos of the invasion. The equipment was "professionally looted" by another account, and may have gone to Iran or Syria. Isn't it significant that equipment that could be used to make nuclear weapons was there in the first place? Don't these constitute components of a WMD program?

As well, if CBS wants to recycle old news in an attempt to influence the election, how about this story: 1.77 metric tons of low-enriched uranium and other nuclear material at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (Saddam's main nuclear research and development center) was secured by the United States and flown out of the country last July. According to the Energy Department this material could have been used to make a radiological dispersion device (a.k.a. a dirty bomb) or "diverted to support a nuclear weapons program." The only thing we found in Iraq that was more hazardous than this haul was Saddam Hussein. The United States was able successfully to deny this dangerous material to terrorists, rogue states or anyone else. This good news story dropped like a stone when it came out. And unlike most of the hype of the last few days, this story has the benefit of being true.

The missing explosives from al Qaqaa also raise the possibility that other WMD-related materials met the same fate. The IAEA had seen the al Qaqaa material in January 2003, but by the time U.S. troops showed up on April 10, they had disappeared. The dual-use technologies mentioned in the other IAEA report also had been moved or looted. This suggests that still other WMDs and related technologies might have been given or taken away in the days leading up to the war, or shortly after the Coalition attacks began. It is widely believed, though not conclusively proved, that much of this went to Syria. The Iraq Survey Group interviewed Iraqi agents who claimed to have helped moved the WMD materials. This charge was repeated by David Kay when he left the ISG earlier this year. The Blix Report found 1,000 tons of chemical weapons missing from Iraq, and last May this column discussed a planned al Qaeda attack in Jordan involving 20 tons of chemicals. The attack was broken up, and the subsequent investigation showed strong links to Syria. Connect your own dots.

So between the al Qaqaa explosives, the dual-use equipment, the Tuwaitha nuclear material, the missing chemical weapons, and the Syrian connection, it sounds like the WMD rationale is much stronger than most critics give it credit for. One can only imagine what Saddam would have done given the chance to put them all together. These are just a few reasons why Operation Iraqi Freedom was the right war, in the right place, at the right time.


— James S. Robbins is an NRO contributor.


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 Post subject: North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material
PostPosted: Thu Feb 03, 2005 11:26 am 
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Washingtonpost.com

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ar ... 5Feb2.html

*****

North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies

By Glenn Kessler
XXXXXXX XXXX Staff Writer
Wednesday, February 2, 2005; Page A01


North Korea has reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium and appears to have exported nuclear material to Libya, U.S. officials informed Asian allies this week.

Two senior officials on the National Security Council, Michael J. Green and William Tobey, told key officials in Asia about the alarming intelligence, a U.S. official said last night. He said the "sole reason" for the trip -- officially billed as consultations about possible talks with North Korea about its nuclear program -- was to brief Japan, South Korea and China about the information.

The nuclear material that North Korea may have exported to Libya was uranium hexafluoride. This is not fissile material but can be enriched into weapons-grade material if it is fed into nuclear centrifuges. Thus, it is considered material that could eventually be used in weapons, making the discovery of the sale disturbing to U.S. officials.

The Bush administration has been grappling for four years about what to do about North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The new information could raise the pressure to act because it suggests that North Korea not only is expanding its program but also could be actively exporting nuclear material.

The determination that North Korea provided the uranium hexafluoride was made by a technical group within the Energy Department. It examined containers obtained from Libya -- which gave up its nuclear programs in a deal with the United States and Britain -- and picked up signatures of plutonium produced at Yongbyon, where North Korea has its nuclear facilities. The U.S. official said that because North Korea probably would have produced much of the uranium hexafluoride at the Yongbyon facility, this was deemed the link that connected the material in the containers to the North Koreans.

"This was not a conclusion reached by the CIA" or the intelligence bureau at the State Department, said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the intelligence matter. "This was the lab technicians from DOE."

He said this gave added credence to the report because it was based not on a murky intelligence assessment but on hard data.

The finding that North Korea has reprocessed fuel rods -- potentially enough material to produce six atomic weapons -- is less surprising. North Korea has long said that it had reprocessed the material, and many U.S. intelligence analysts concluded a year ago that the reprocessing had taken place. Yet it is significant that the Bush administration has decided to brief its allies on its conclusion.

The New York Times first reported last night that North Korea appeared to have produced uranium hexafluoride and exported it.

Talks involving the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea have yielded little progress. No meeting has been held since last June, when the Bush administration put its most recent offer on the table. The United States has alleged that North Korea is building a uranium-enrichment program and that it must acknowledge all of its nuclear programs before any incentives begin. But the government in Pyongyang has denied it has a uranium program.

Under the proposal, if North Korea agrees to terminate its nuclear programs, South Korea and other U.S. allies could provide immediate energy assistance to North Korea, which would have three months to disclose its programs and have its claims verified. The United States would then join its allies in giving written security assurances and participate in a process that might ultimately result in direct U.S. aid.

North Korea has indicated a willingness to return to the talks if President Bush does not indicate what Pyongyang calls his "hostile policy" during his State of the Union address tonight. Bush first labeled North Korea part of an "axis of evil" -- along with Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- in his State of the Union address three years ago.

But the U.S. determination that North Korea has obtained the material for six weapons under Bush's watch and mastered the art of uranium processing significantly raises the stakes in the impasse over North Korea's programs.

Libya has renounced its nuclear programs, as well as other programs for weapons of mass destruction, and provided all of the materials to the U.S. government for its inspection. The Libya material has exposed a vast nuclear smuggling ring emanating from Pakistan, but the North Korea finding has raised question about whether Pyongyang helped supply other countries.

China and South Korea have publicly complained that the Bush administration has not shown enough flexibility in the negotiations over North Korea's programs.



© 2005 The XXXXXXX XXXX Company

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 Post subject: The Deal to Disarm Kadafi
PostPosted: Mon Mar 14, 2005 1:58 pm 
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LA Times

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld ... -headlines

*****

The Deal to Disarm Kadafi
Libya's decision to hand over its banned weapons followed lengthy talks and an equipment seizure. Some see ideas for dealing with Iran.
By Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer
Times Staff Writers

March 13, 2005

LONDON — The senior British official paced his office as evening turned to night, every few minutes grabbing the telephone to dial Tripoli, the Libyan capital.

"Have they broadcast it yet?" he asked Anthony Layden, the British ambassador.

"There's a football match on television," Layden replied.

Three days earlier, Libya had agreed to give up its nuclear and chemical weapons programs in return for an end to economic sanctions, concluding months of secret negotiations with the British and Americans.

A script had been hammered out word by word in a marathon meeting. The Libyan foreign minister would announce the decision on national television and the country's leader, Moammar Kadafi, would follow with a brief, but mandatory, public endorsement.

The hours ticked by as British Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush waited for the announcement. It was late 2003 and both needed this victory to stem increasing criticism over intelligence failures before the Iraq war.

"We were worrying that it was all going to get called off," said the British official, who recounted the episode on condition his name not be used. "It got later and later."

In recent interviews, participants in the three-way talks have provided the most detailed description yet of the events leading up to Libya's announcement, which marked a historic shift for what was considered an outlaw regime as it tried to win back its place within the world community.

Officials still disagree about exactly why Kadafi gave up the programs. Some information supports President Bush's contention that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the broader U.S. doctrine of pre-emptive strikes forced the Libyan leader to act.

But several British and U.S. officials said Kadafi had been trying for years to surrender the weapons to end the international sanctions crippling the Libyan economy and smooth the way for his eldest son's eventual assumption of power.

At a time when the Bush administration is talking tough about Iran's nuclear program, some diplomats say the mix of negotiations, good intelligence work and pressure brought to bear on Libya offers a game plan for dealing with Tehran.

When the soccer match finally ended on the night of Dec. 19, 2003, Libya's foreign minister, Mohammed Abderrahmane Chalgam, went on national television to announce that the country would disclose and dismantle its unconventional weapons programs.

Kadafi then appeared briefly to deliver his public blessing, calling it a "wise decision and a courageous step."

Shortly after 10 p.m. in London, Blair and Bush made separate public appearances to praise Kadafi's decision and promise to help Libya back into the community of nations.

In his office, the senior British official breathed a sigh of relief.

"It was a big prize," he said later. "We weren't sure until the end that it would actually work."

Within a month of the announcement, U.S. and British experts were swarming over the secret installations where Libya manufactured chemical weapons and had started work on a nuclear bomb. What they found would surprise and alarm them, and underscore just how big a prize they'd won.

The groundwork for Kadafi's decision was laid not only by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but by overtures from Libya to the U.S. and Britain that began in the late 1990s, according to officials from the three countries.

Libya approached the Clinton administration in 1999 with an offer to give up its chemical weapons program in exchange for an easing of the sanctions imposed because of its alleged support for terrorism, a former administration official said.

The U.S. refused, telling the Libyans that taking responsibility for the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 was a much higher priority, the former official said.

The British were more receptive. They reestablished diplomatic relations with Tripoli in July 1999. Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Lockerbie attack for trial by a Scottish court, and the U.S. and Britain agreed to push for a temporary lifting of U.N. sanctions.

One of the Libyan agents was convicted in January 2001, and momentum toward a final resolution of Lockerbie picked up in October 2001 when a delegation from Libya slipped into London to meet with British and U.S. officials, according to a participant in those talks.

The Libyan delegation was headed by Mousa Kusa, the head of external intelligence, who had been expelled from Britain nearly two decades earlier on suspicion of coordinating terrorist attacks.

The negotiations eventually led to Libya taking responsibility for the deaths of 259 people on the plane and 11 on the ground and agreeing to pay $2.7 billion to the relatives.

But U.S. and British participants said they had made it clear to the Libyans that resolving Lockerbie was not enough.

"We had made a point that while Lockerbie was extremely important, a sine qua non for progress on full reintegration would depend on addressing the WMD programs," said one official who, like most people interviewed for this article, spoke on condition his name not be used.

Negotiations over Libya's weapons programs gained urgency in March 2003 after Seif Islam Kadafi, the leader's eldest son and likely successor, met with British intelligence agents at a London hotel.

"Let's clear the air about the rumor that there are weapons of mass destruction in Libya," the younger Kadafi said, according to a senior U.S. official briefed on the conversation. Because Kadafi was regarded as an emissary from his father, his message was seen as a signal that the Libyan leader was ready to make a deal.

By then, the U.S. and British knew that Libya, despite denials, had manufactured chemical weapons. They also knew that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's network was supplying equipment and know-how for Libya's nuclear weapons program.

In the weeks that followed, two officials from the CIA and two from its British counterpart, MI6, met sporadically with Kusa and other Libyans in London and several other European cities but made little progress.

"There were periodic contacts, but the Libyans were not admitting they had a nuclear program," said the senior U.S. official. "They were being coy."

Apart from Bush and Blair, only a handful of senior officials in Washington and London knew of the negotiations. They feared that a leak could mobilize opposition either inside Libya or in the larger Arab world, giving Kadafi a reason for second thoughts.

In late August 2003, U.S. and British intelligence received a tip that a Malaysian factory affiliated with Khan was sending a shipment of nuclear equipment to Tripoli. One former official said covert operatives watched as five containers were loaded onto a ship in Kuala Lumpur and a satellite tracked the vessel to the Persian Gulf port of Dubai.

Agents also watched as Khan's accomplices removed the crates in Dubai and, a few days later, loaded them onto a second vessel, the BBC China.

As the BBC China passed through the Suez Canal and entered the Mediterranean Sea on its way to Tripoli, agents on other ships monitored its progress. On Oct. 4, the ship's captain was sent a radio message ordering him to divert to the southern Italian port of Taranto, where U.S. and Italian authorities removed the crates.

A former CIA official declined to confirm any details, but said, "It was a great operation, a lot of derring-do."

Later, Bush and other U.S. officials praised the seizure as an intelligence triumph that, combined with the hard-line American approach on Iraq, forced Kadafi's hand.

"The capture of the BBC China helped make clear to Libya that we had a lot of information about what it was doing," said John S. Wolf, who was assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation at the time.

The senior British official, who was involved in the negotiations with Libya, acknowledged that confiscating the shipment was important, but said Libya had already strongly hinted at the existence of a nuclear weapons program and intended to give it up.

"The BBC China was another nail in the coffin," he said. "But one can overplay the significance of that event."

One sign of Kadafi's intentions had come in September 2003, when a small team of CIA and MI6 agents flew to Tripoli in an unmarked CIA jet for another round of talks, the first in Libya. They sought permission to bring in specialists to examine the weapons installations, according to two U.S. officials involved in the operation.

A European diplomat said Libyan officials told him later that the decision was driven by economics.

"From my conversations with the Libyans, it appeared that they had determined that it was too expensive to develop nuclear weapons, both in specific terms and in terms of sanctions," the diplomat said.

Seif Islam Kadafi told CBS News last year that U.S. pressure was not behind his father's decision.

"First of all, we started negotiating before the beginning of the war," he said. "And it's not because we are afraid or under American pressure or blackmail."

Still, the talks picked up speed after the cargo was seized. Within days, a larger contingent of CIA and MI6 experts arrived in Libya, said officials involved in the process. A far more exhaustive inventory of Libya's nuclear and chemical weapons programs was taken during a 12-day trip that started on Dec. 1, said one of the officials.

On Dec. 16, 2003, a Libyan delegation sat down to work out the final details of the deal over lunch with their U.S. and British counterparts at the private Travellers Club in the heart of London.

Along with Kusa, the Libyans were represented by their ambassador to Italy, Abdul-Ati Obeidi, and Mohammed Azwai, envoy to Britain. Across from them were William Ehrman and David Landsman, senior officials from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and two MI6 agents. The small U.S. team was headed by Robert Joseph, the National Security Council's counter-proliferation head, and Stephen Kappes, the CIA deputy director of operations. Kappes, a veteran case officer who had known Kusa for years, had supervised the intelligence operation and led the initial visits to Libya.

The wrangling lasted 10 hours. Two participants said the British and U.S. teams insisted that Libya clearly admit that it possessed chemical and nuclear weapons programs and promise to dismantle them.

"It was a tough meeting," one said. "They were giving up things that cost a lot of money, and a lot of people had their careers tied up in these programs. It was not an easy thing to shut them down and have them removed."

In the end, the Libyans agreed to relinquish everything connected with both programs but balked at the demand that Kadafi make the announcement. A compromise was reached allowing someone else to make the announcement. But the Libyan leader would bless the decision publicly.

British Airways Flight 898 arrived at Tripoli international airport Jan. 18, 2004. Aboard was a 14-member team of U.S. and British experts under the command of Donald Mahley, a deputy assistant secretary of State for arms control and retired Army nuclear weapons officer.

The Americans were the first U.S. diplomats to officially visit Libya since 1980. Their passports carried special stamps from the State Department permitting them to enter the country.

Fearing Kadafi might change his mind, the team worked day and night to inventory hundreds of tons of equipment sent by the Khan network.

Their top priority was to remove key components of the uranium enrichment plant being built to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The Libyans had amassed much more equipment than the U.S. imagined, but experts found that a working enrichment plant was a distant dream.

Two days after the team arrived, the Libyans also turned over hundreds of pages of blueprints for manufacturing a nuclear warhead, which they had bought from the Khan ring. The plans were deemed so sensitive that they were put in a secure diplomatic pouch, and two Americans alternated sleeping with them under their pillow, one of the participants said.

While the U.S. and British team was eager to get the plans and other sensitive material on a plane as soon as possible, the Libyans were eager not to draw attention to the hand-over. Kusa insisted that a U.S. plane could only land at night at a little-used airport outside Tripoli and that it had to be gone before dawn.

At 9:30 p.m. on Jan. 28, 2004, a giant C-17 cargo plane from McCord Air Force Base in Tacoma, Wash., its U.S. Air Force markings painted over, landed at the airport.

Less than five hours later, at 2:17 a.m., the aircraft took off, carrying 55,000 pounds of nuclear equipment and the guidance systems for long-range missiles. It was bound for Tennessee, where the material would be transferred to the national weapons laboratory at Oak Ridge.

"We wanted to get the aircraft out of there as quickly as possible," said a U.S. official who was present at the time. "We lived with the possibility that Kadafi might change his mind."

Two months later, an American-flagged freighter sailed out of Tripoli carrying more than 1,000 tons of additional equipment from Libya's nuclear program as well as five long-range Scud missiles bought from North Korea.

The Bush administration lifted most restrictions on Libya and resumed diplomatic relations last summer.

Officials said they hoped Kadafi's decision would send a message to Iran, which the U.S. accuses of trying to develop nuclear weapons.

"We wanted to show other countries that there was a way out," said a U.S. diplomat based in Europe.

Iran concealed its nuclear program for nearly 20 years but insists that the purpose is to generate electricity. The regime has refused to back down in the face of U.S. threats to take the matter to the United Nations for sanctions.

Policymakers and experts point out that there are differences between Libya and Iran. Chief among them is Kadafi's iron grip on power, which meant that no one was likely to challenge his decision.

Still, some argue that the Bush administration's refusal to negotiate with Iran or participate in talks initiated by Britain, France and Germany ignores what happened in Libya.

The administration modified its position Friday, announcing that it would drop objections to Iran joining the World Trade Organization and allow it to buy spare parts for civilian aircraft to bolster the Europeans' negotiating stance.

"The most important lesson from the Libyan experience is that diplomacy goes hand in hand with the credible threat of military force to maximize influence on a nation pursuing weapons of mass destruction," said Richard L. Russell, a former U.S. intelligence officer who teaches at Georgetown University in Washington. "Neither is any good without the other."

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http://WWW.HSPIG.ORG


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 Post subject: No Syrian WMD Transfer? Not So Fast ...
PostPosted: Wed Apr 27, 2005 1:49 pm 
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Joined: Tue Feb 03, 2004 11:07 pm
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HT Captain's Quarters

http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/ ... 004368.php

Moderator's Note: The MainStream Media still can't figure out the "shell" game all the ME players are playing.

*****

<b>No Syrian WMD Transfer? Not So Fast ...</b>

Reports based on the release of addenda from last year's Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) report by Charles Duelfer claim that the ISG stated categorically that no evidence existed of WMD being shipped into Syria, one of the explanations given by several high-ranking officers at CENTCOM for the lack of WMD found in Iraq. However, the Washington Times reports this morning that the ISG report did not make any such categorical denial of WMD transfers. In order to understand the nuances of the ISG addenda, take a look at the wording of the original CNN report:

Quote:
"ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place," the report said.

The group also said it had been unable to complete its investigation because of security concerns and couldn't rule out an "unofficial" transfer of material. ...

"It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikely that conclusive information would have been found," the report said.


What does this tell us? First, by its inclusion in the addenda and not the main body, it tells us ... nothing. The data remains inconclusive, and that's all. ISG could not go into Syria, nor into the Bekaa Valley that until this week was controlled by Syria, to determine if any kind of transfers took place. The only conclusion they could reach is that official transfers never took place, meaning that Saddam's files contained no records of any such movement of materiel between Iraq and Syria. The report further tells us that had the ISG had the time and resources to follow up on the leads provided, they still probably would find out nothing, given the geopolitical difficulties of invading Syria to complete the investigation.

Had Duelfer and the ISG meant to conclusively state that no WMD transfers of any kind had occurred, it would not have been left as a footnote or an addendum. That usage indicates an explanation for an unfulfilled mandate of the mission, not a positive conclusion, as a close read of the language used indicates.

The Washington Times article makes this more clear. In reading other parts of the same addenda, the ISG obviously did not intend to close the books on a Syrian transfer of WMD, and in fact still believe that such a scenario not only was possible, but somewhat likely:

Quote:
Inspector Charles Duelfer, who heads the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), made the findings in an addendum to his final report filed last year. He said the search for WMD in Iraq -- the main reason President Bush went to war to oust Saddam Hussein -- has been exhausted without finding such weapons. Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s.

But on the question of Syria, Mr. Duelfer did not close the books. "ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war," Mr. Duelfer said in a report posted on the CIA's Web site Monday night.

He cited some evidence of a transfer. "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined," he said. "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation."


But Mr. Duelfer said he was unable to complete that aspect of the probe because "the declining security situation limited and finally halted this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, but further investigation may be undertaken when circumstances on the ground improve."

The media spin on WMD remains in full force. The truth is that without a full reckoning and complete access to the entire Southwest Asia area, no WMD search could possibly be complete. Nor does the evidence in the report support a conclusion that the WMD did not exist, as the above quote shows. Duelfer and his team did not stop because the WMD didn't exist; they stopped because they had run out of time, resources, and jurisdiction. Duelfer recommends further investigation, a clear indication that he believes the question remains open on WMD transfers to Syria, a recommendation that CNN and other media sources predictably leaves out of their reports.
Posted by Captain Ed at April 27, 2005 06:26 AM

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Last edited by rwright on Wed Apr 27, 2005 2:47 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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 Post subject: Russia Moved Iraqi WMD
PostPosted: Wed Apr 27, 2005 2:30 pm 
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NewsMax.com

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/article ... 0625.shtml

*****

<b>Russia Moved Iraqi WMD</b>

Charles R. Smith
Thursday, March 3, 2005

Moscow Moved Weapons to Syria and Lebanon

According to a former top Bush administration official, Russian special forces teams moved weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq to Syria.

"I am absolutely sure that Russian Spetsnatz units moved WMD out of Iraq before the war," stated John Shaw, the former deputy undersecretary for international technology security.

According to Shaw, Russian units hid Saddam's arsenal inside Syria and in Lebanon's Bekka valley.

"While in Iraq I uncovered detailed information that Spetsnatz units shredded records and moved all WMD and specified advanced munitions out of Iraq to Syria and Lebanon," stated Shaw during an exclusive interview.

"I received information from several sources naming the exact Russian units, what they took and where they took both WMD materials and conventional explosives. Moscow made a 2001 agreement with Saddam Hussein to clear up all Russian involvement in WMD systems in Iraq," stated Shaw.

Shaw's assertions match the information provided by U.S. military forces that satellite surveillance showed extensive large-vehicle traffic crossing the Syrian border prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Moscow Paranoid About WMD

Shaw's information also backs allegations by a wide variety of sources of Russia's direct involvement in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. One U.N. bioterrorism expert announced that Russia has been Iraq's "main supplier of the materials and know-how to weaponize anthrax, botulism and smallpox."

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Robert Goldberg cited former U.N. weapons inspector Richard Spertzel, who stated that Moscow supplied Baghdad with fermentation equipment to produce biotoxins.

According to Spertzel, the Russians on the U.N. inspection team in Iraq were "paranoid" about his efforts to uncover smallpox production.

Goldberg noted that no country has "done more to rebuild" Saddam's chemical and biological weapons programs or "been more aggressive in helping hide the truth" than Russia.

It is a fact that Saddam Hussein rose to power backed by Russian weapons and Russian money. Saddam was in debt to Moscow for over $8 billion for the arms he purchased from Russia when he was captured by U.S. forces.

The primary Iraqi chemical weapons were VX nerve gas and mustard gas, a blistering agent, both obtained from Russia.

According to the book "Russian Military Power," published in 1982, "It is known that the Soviets maintain stocks of CW (chemical weapons) agents."

The two primary Russian chemical weapons in the 1982 Soviet inventory were the nerve agent "VX" and "blistering agents - developments of mustard gas used so effectively in World War I."

Russian Chemical Weapons in Iraq

Iraq did most of its WMD killing using Russian-made MiG and Sukhoi aircraft equipped with chemical sprayers. In addition, Saddam used French-made artillery and helicopters to dump gas on Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurds.

Iraq obtained Russian delivery systems and the same inventory of Russian-made chemical weapons at the same time. Iraqi SU-22 Fitter attack jets were armed with Warsaw Pact-designed bombs filled with chemical weapons. Iraq used these Russian jet fighters to drop chemical weapons on Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iraq tried to use these SU-22 jets during the 1991 Gulf War, but they were detected and destroyed on the ground before they could launch a deadly chemical attack.

Other Russian weapons found with chemical weapons include the FROG-7 missile, 122 mm rockets, 152 mm artillery and the M-1937 82 mm mortars. All the Iraqi artillery missiles, rockets, shells and mortar rounds filled with chemical weapons are of Russian design.

Iraqi forces were trained by Russians in the use of chemical weapons and equipped by Russia with anti-chemical suits. The Iraqi armed forces were trained, equipped and supplied with the proper logistics to perform chemical warfare by Russia.

Lebanon and Syria

The arming of Iraq with such weapons has a direct impact on events today in the Middle East. The presence of former Iraqi WMD systems in Lebanon raises serious questions surrounding the Feb. 14 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Many blame Syria for Hariri's murder.

However, the possibility that Hariri discovered the location of the Iraqi WMD systems inside his country lends some credible backing to a Syrian assassination effort to silence him.

In addition, the sudden sale of advanced missile and other weapons to Damascus by Moscow also supports the allegation that Syria is hiding something for Russia.

Russian weapons makers have previously insisted on hard, cold cash payments for their missiles, especially after the fall of Saddam and the collapse of credit deals done with Baghdad. More importantly, the Syrian economy is in bad shape, making it difficult for Damascus to come up with the required money for advanced Russian weapons.

Instead, it now appears that Moscow has extended both very good terms and no down payment required to Syria for an extensive purchase of advanced missiles and weapons. This is in contrast to weapons sales to other "good" Russian customers such as China, which can afford to pay up front for weapon systems.

CIA Failed

There is no question that the Russian effort to remove Iraqi WMD systems was the most successful intelligence operation of the 21st century. The Russians were able to move hundreds of tons of chemical, biological and nuclear materials without being discovered by CIA satellites or NSA radio listening posts.

"There is a clear sense on how effective they were," noted Shaw.

"The fact that the CIA did not know shows just how successful the Russian operation was," he concluded.

Reprinted from NewsMax.com

_________________
Ron Wright,
Board of Advisors, Security Council Member,
http://WWW.HSPIG.ORG


Last edited by rwright on Wed Apr 27, 2005 2:38 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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 Post subject: New evidence: Saddam's WMD in Lebanon
PostPosted: Wed Apr 27, 2005 2:35 pm 
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World Net Daily

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/artic ... E_ID=38581

Thursday, May 20, 2004
GEOSTRATEGY-DIRECT INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
New evidence: Saddam's WMD in Lebanon
Weapons transferred to Syria before war, then to Bekaa Valley

Posted: May 20, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern

Editor's note: WorldNetDaily brings readers exclusive, up-to-the-minute global intelligence news and analysis from Geostrategy-Direct, a new online newsletter edited by veteran journalist Robert Morton and featuring the "Backgrounder" column compiled by Bill Gertz. Geostrategy-Direct is a subscription-based service produced by the publishers of WorldTribune.com, a free news service frequently linked by the editors of WorldNetDaily.

© 2004 WorldNetDaily.com

Over the last few months, the U.S. intelligence community has received new evidence a sizable amount of Iraqi WMD systems, components and platforms were transferred to Syria in the weeks leading up to the U.S.-led war in Iraq, reports Geostrategy-Direct, the global intelligence news service.

But chances are the Bush administration won't be releasing this information for a while.

The convoys were spotted by U.S. satellites in early 2003, but the contents of the WMD convoys from Iraq to Syria were not confirmed.

Confirmation later came from Iraqi scientists and technicians questioned by a U.S. team that was searching for Saddam's conventional weapons. But all they knew was the convoys were heading west to Syria.

But over the last few months, U.S. intelligence managed to track the Iraqi WMD convoy to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

Through the use of satellites, electronic monitoring and human intelligence, the intelligence community has determined that much, if not all, of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons assets are being protected by Syria, with Iranian help, in the Bekaa Valley.

The Syrians received word from Saddam Hussein in late 2002 that the Iraqi WMD would be arriving and Syrian army engineering units began digging huge trenches in the Bekaa Valley.

Saddam paid more than $30 million in cash for Syria to build the pits, acquire the Iraqi WMD and conceal them.

At first, U.S. intelligence thought Iraqi WMD was stored in northern Syria. But in February 2003 a Syrian defector told U.S. intelligence the WMD was buried in or around three Syrian Air Force installations.

But intelligence sources said the Syrians kept dual-use nuclear components for themselves while transferring the more incriminating material to Lebanon.

Related stories:

Does Hezbollah have long-range missiles?

U.S. intel: WMD went to Syria last year

Subscribe to Geostrategy-Direct.

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http://WWW.HSPIG.ORG


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